

Irony's Echo

Let me suggest that if a typical book looks like the illustration on the left, the typical translation looks like the picture on the right:

PLEASE NOTE:

For copyright reasons the cover of Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf* cannot be shown here. Click on the link to see an image:

[http://images.vpro.nl/img.db?38786520++s\(160\)](http://images.vpro.nl/img.db?38786520++s(160))

Figure 1: Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 1925-26

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PLEASE NOTE:

For copyright reasons the cover of the Dutch translation of *Mein Kampf* cannot be shown here. Click on the link to see an image:

http://oudnieuws.web-log.nl/oud_nieuws/images/18_juli_mein_kampf.jpg

Figure 2: Adolf Hitler, *Mijn kamp*, translated by Steven Barends, 1939

It may seem perverse to call *Mein Kampf* a typical book. However, I choose this example for its directness. Its cover shows the author looking straight at us, both in the original German and in its Dutch translation. When we start reading the book, the author, Adolf Hitler, speaks directly to us, in the first person singular, both in the original German and in the Dutch translation. Here are the opening sentences of the book's preface:

Am 1. April 1924 hatte ich, auf Grund des Urteilspruches des Münchner Volksgerichts von diesem Tage, meine Festungshaft zu Landsberg am Lech anzutreten. Damit bot sich mir nach Jahren ununterbrochener Arbeit zum ersten Male die Möglichkeit, an ein Werk heranzugehen, das von vielen gefordert und von mir selbst als zweckmäßig für die Bewegung empfunden wurde. (Hitler 1925-6, vi)

Op den 1 en April van het jaar 1924 werd ik, tengevolge van het vonnis dat het Münchener Volksgericht dienzelfden dag over mij velde, te Landsberg a/d Lech opgesloten, teneinde mijn vestingstraf te ondergaan. Hierdoor kreeg ik, na jaren van onafgebroken activiteit, voor het eerst den tijd, om mij te wijden aan een werk, dat velen van mij hadden geëischt, en dat mijzelf ook nuttig scheen voor de beweging. (Hitler 1939a: xxvii)

The German first-person singular pronoun 'ich' ('I') in the first line refers as unmistakably to Adolf Hitler as the Dutch 'ik' (in the second line). Yet the Dutch words were not written by Hitler himself but by the Dutch translator of *Mein Kampf*, Steven Barends. Nevertheless there are good reasons for assuming that the voice addressing us not just in the German but in the Dutch as well is meant to be Hitler's. Not only is the Dutch version an authorised translation, as the title page announces ("Geautoriseerde uitgave"), but the packaging of the book indicates that the translator is evidently in sympathy with Hitler's views. The publishing house specialised in propaganda for the extreme right, and the back pages advertised some of Steven Barends's own publications: poetry collections with rousing New Order titles like *Ochtendappèl* ('morning parade') and *Viva la muerte!*, together with a semifictional "story of blood and borders" called *Brown Rebels in Austria*. During the Second World War Barends would join the SS. After the war he was banned from publishing his own work for ten years but

had a lifelong ban on publishing translations imposed on him – his translating had obviously been even more obnoxious than his original writing.¹

If we feel entitled to read the ‘I’ that Barends writes as coinciding with Hitler’s ‘I’, this is because there is very little to separate Barends’s voice from Hitler’s. The book is identified as a translation on the title page, but that is all. There is no translator’s preface or epilogue, and in the text itself the translator also keeps in the background. The paratexts at the back of the book, and the name of the publishing house reveal Barends as a Nazi supporter. This ideological alignment of translator and author strengthens the consonance of voice. This is not to say that the translator does not have a presence or does not take up a position in the translated discourse itself. However this position is never profiled as diverging from the author’s, and so it tends to be subsumed under it. More than that, everything suggests Barends was perfectly happy to act as Hitler’s local helper.

Things are very different with the American translation which a team led by Alvin Johnson brought out in New York in 1939. This version, a “fully annotated”, “complete and unabridged edition” was sponsored by a committee including Pearl Buck, Theodore Dreiser, Albert Einstein, Thomas Mann, Eugene O’Neill and others (Hitler 1939: n.p.). The translation was by Helmut Ripperger and others, as the Publishers’ Note acknowledges (*ibid.*). The book featured a map, printed opposite the title page and showing Germany as a black oil-slick ominously expanding beyond its borders. It is reproduced here as *Figure 5*.



Figure 3: From Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, ed. Alvin Johnson et al., 1939
(By permission of The Random House Group Ltd)

The date on the map, “January 1, 1939”, served as reminder of recent events: the *Anschluss* with Austria of March 1938 and the annexation of the ‘Sudeten’ areas of Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1938, among other things. The introduction to the translation, signed by the editorial team, left the reader in no doubt about the editors’ opinion of the qualities of *Mein Kampf* and their view of the book’s message:

The reader must bear in mind that Hitler is no artist in literary expression, but a rough-and-ready political pamphleteer often indifferent to grammar and syntax alike. [...] *Mein Kampf* is a propagandistic essay by a violent partisan. As such it often warps historical truth and sometimes ignores it completely. We have, therefore, felt it our duty to accompany the text with factual information which constitutes an extensive critique of the original. [...] The separation between text and commentary is clearly indicated, so that the reader will have no difficulty on that score. (Hitler 1939: viii-x)

A further editorial note explained that the typography of the translation follows that of the first German edition and that passages which were left out of the first English translation of *Mein Kampf*, the radically abridged version by E.T.S. Dugdale published in London in 1933 (Barnes and Barnes 1980: 2-18), had been marked with typographical symbols in the margin; there are many such passages in the book.

¹ <http://www.poeziemarathon.nl/dichters/barends.html>

When we start reading this translation, it is impossible simply to superimpose Hitler's first person on the 'I' that speaks in the English text:

Am 1. April 1924 hatte ich, auf Grund des Urteilspruches des Münchner Volksgerichts von diesem Tage, meine Festungshaft zu Landsberg am Lech anzutreten. Damit bot sich mir nach Jahren ununterbrochener Arbeit zum ersten Male die Möglichkeit, an ein Werk heranzugehen, das von vielen gefordert und von mir selbst als zweckmäßig für die Bewegung empfunden wurde.

On April 1, 1924, because of the sentence handed down by the People's Court of Munich, I had to begin that day, serving my term in the fortress at Landsberg on the Lech. Thus, after years of uninterrupted work, I was afforded for the first time an opportunity to embark on a task insisted upon by many and felt to be serviceable to the movement by myself. (Hitler 1939: n.p.)

The way the translation is framed by editorial introductions and annotations highly critical of *Mein Kampf* emphasises the ideological divide separating translator and editors from Hitler. Formally, the American translation of the actual text of *Mein Kampf* looks exactly like the Dutch one in that both present Hitler as speaking in the first person singular. In both cases the translators relay Hitler's words as if quoting them in direct speech. They both account for the fact that they have Hitler speak in a language other than his native German by affixing the label 'translation' to their texts. The key difference between the Dutch and the American translation is that the latter makes the quotation marks clearly visible. Steven Barends's version can be read as tending towards free direct speech, the kind of speech situation in which someone's words are reported in the form of direct quotation but the discourse which introduces and frames the reported discourse has been removed. True, Barends's version announces itself as a translation, but it uses its paratexts, including the label "authorised edition", as a quality badge to signal a philological and ideological allegiance that allows the translator to stand in the author's shadow, indeed behind him, out of sight. This discretion creates the illusion that we are reading Hitler speaking in Dutch. It all but cancels out the distraction caused by the knowledge that there is someone voicing Hitler's words for us in a different tongue.

The American translation separates the philological from the ideological. It too claims philological accuracy but makes it a part of the wider agenda that informs the venture as a whole. This agenda is anti-Nazi. It requires a full, unexpurgated, scrupulously accurate rendering of Hitler's words, so as to expose them for what they are – to the extent, of course, that translation is able to show them for what they are. It also requires a clear statement of ideological difference with Hitler's message. As a result, the editorial paratexts make the actual translation into an object of contemplation, not just as regards the book's message but also its style. The Book-of-the-Month Club prefaced its edition of the translation with an appraisal by Dorothy Thompson which warned: "The reader will find the English writing rhetorical, turbid, and digressive, and the text disorganised. Do not, however, criticize the translators" (Hitler 1939: n.p.). Stylistically, that is, the translators have chosen to write an idiom they would not otherwise have written, and the reader is meant to make allowance for this. Most importantly, of course, the anti-Nazi stance in the editorial team's introduction and extensive annotations (some 80,000 words in all) draws a sharp line between their values and Hitler's. In that sense Hitler's own words are held up for inspection and put as if between quotation marks. In Cecilia Wadensjö's terms: the replay recedes in favour of the display (1998: 247).

Despite this formal separation between the framing discourse and Hitler's words, the clash of values articulated in the translation's paratexts permeates the translation itself. Even as they move from the frame to the translated text, readers are meant to remain aware that the translator does not wish to be associated with either the style or the ideas of the original. This punctures the pretence that translators suspend their own identity as they usurp the first person singular in translation. The 'I' that addresses the reader in English refers exclusively to Hitler and not to the translator, even though it was the translator who wrote "I". The first-person pronoun therefore carries a double load: the translator's implied 'I' is the face behind the mask. The figure being voiced is to be distinguished from the self that is doing the voicing, indeed the

latter insists in keeping its distance from the former, and the way the translated discourse as a whole is keyed makes this abundantly clear (Wadensjö 1998: 243-5).

The 1939 American translation of *Mein Kampf* illustrates the issue I am concerned with in this chapter. It is that of conflicts of value. What happens when translators translate texts they strongly disagree with or disapprove of, especially when ideological or moral values are at stake? It is normally expected of translators either that they are in agreement with what they choose or consent to translate or that they adopt a position of neutrality. In a short reflection of 1897, 'A Plea for the Translator', Mary Serrano, the translator of an abridged version of Marie Bashkirtseff's diary, put this demand in all its starkness. A translator, she declared, must be

absolutely unselfish, content to live a reflected intellectual life, thinking always the thoughts of others, reflecting, like a mirror, the beauties of others, for which he receives no credit, and their defects, which are attributed to the distorting medium of his translation; held responsible for opinions which may be diametrically opposed to his own, for faults of taste which shock his aesthetic senses, and for views on morals and on life which he holds in detestation. He must be conscientious beyond all proof, capable of resisting the temptation to alter or to modify in the slightest degree his author's meaning, though to render it faithfully may be bitterer to him than wormwood. (in Kartman 1999: 67)

Approval or indifference are probably the default positions. In situations where a conflict of values may arise, professional ethics prescribe impartiality, the translator's conscious suspension of personal views and values. Codes of conduct and definitions of professional roles governing interpreting are particularly revealing in this respect. To take just one random example, the National Register for Public Service Interpreters in the United Kingdom issues a code of conduct for public service interpreters which stipulates that interpreters should "not enter into the discussion, give advice or express opinions or reactions to any of the parties", and that they should "act in an impartial and professional manner" (Phelan 2001: 44-45). In nearly all cases this stipulation follows the requirement that interpreters shall interpret truthfully and faithfully what is said, without addition, omission or alteration.

The suspension of personal views and values is not always easy to achieve for translators or interpreters, even when they are in sympathy with what they translate. The use of the first person in particular may bring about a degree of identification with the anterior speaker's position that affects the translator emotionally. Writing about the hearings of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the 1990s, Antjie Krog reports on a young Tswana interpreter traumatised by his work; he found interpreting the victims' testimonies particularly harrowing "because you use the first person all the time. I have no distance when I say 'I'... it runs through me with 'I'" (Krog 1999: 195).

In the following pages I am interested in translators who object on moral, religious, ideological or other grounds to all or part of what they are translating. I will restrict myself to written translation, where it is often easier for translators to act as gatekeepers, especially for texts that are out of copyright. I will assume that the majority of translations are made for audiences that have no access to the original texts. I am therefore interested only in translations that show evidence, of one kind or another, of a translator intervening in a text to mark disapproval or reservation or an unwillingness to write what might have been written had there been no conflict of values. I will leave aside all those cases where only a comparison with the original could identify an intervention by the translator. I will begin by reviewing a few more examples and then attempt to construct a model that can deal with situations of this kind. The model will first explore the idea of translation as quotation before bringing on the concept of irony.

In the paratexts of the 1939 American translation of *Mein Kampf* the editors and translators dissociated themselves from Hitler's book and thus ensured a critical reading of the translation itself. The translation is directly affected by the frame that surrounds it. This is also the case in the later English translation by Ralph Mannheim, first published in 1943 and reprinted several times since. Unlike Ripperger, Mannheim intervenes in the actual translation

by inserting the occasional footnote to clarify stylistic issues. Hitler's style and sometimes grammar and logic are so poor that the English also looks substandard; Mannheim covers himself against the charge of writing substandard English by quoting the original German of which the English is a close reproduction (Hitler 1995). Another wartime translation, *The Speeches of Hitler*, published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is framed in a similar way. Looking outwardly like what Christiane Nord would call a 'documentary' translation (1997: 47-50), its framing makes it into a political weapon turned against its original author, as indeed the Foreword states:

This book may give to the English student, in some measure, material on which to form a conception of Hitler's thought and methods. From this he will learn what it is that we are fighting, especially when he remembers the extent of the deception practised by Hitler. If it should succeed in doing this, its purpose will have been fulfilled. (Hitler 1942: iii)

In a very different context, a very similar form of framing the translation of a text regarded as belonging in a hostile camp is offered by the first English translation of the Qur'an. This was Alexander Ross's rendering of 1649, based on the 1647 French version of André du Ryer. In his preface ('The Translator to the Christian Reader') Ross warns his readers:

Thou shalt finde it of so rude, and incongruous a composure, so farced with contradictions, blasphemies, obscene speeches, and ridiculous fables, that some modest, and more ratioll *Mahometans* have thus excused it, that their Prophet wrote an hundred and twenty thousand sayings, whereof three thousand only are good; the residue [...] are false and ridiculous. (Ross 1649: A2v)

Positioning himself as a stout Christian addressing fellow Christians, Ross is aware of the potential danger of allowing the primary text of a rival religion to speak for itself. He remains confident however that "if thou hast been so a true Votary to orthodox Religion, as to keep thyself untainted by these follies; this shall not hurt thee" (Ross 1649: A3r). He concludes his preface by turning the tables on anyone who might doubt the wisdom of his enterprise and argues the book will serve as an antidote: seeing the absurdities and poison in these writings at first hand will actually strengthen Christians in their faith:

Such as it is, I present to thee, having taken the pains only to translate it out of *French*, not doubting, though it hath been a poyson, that hath infected a very great, but most unsound part of the universe, it may prove an Antidote, to confirme in thee the health of Christianity. (*ibid.*)

Since Ross follows Du Ryer rather than the original Arabic, he has also translated Du Ryer's preface. The opening of 'The French Epistle to the Reader' chimes with Ross's own line: "The Book is a long conference of God, the Angels and Mahomet, which that false Prophet grossly invented" (Ross 1649: A3v); it ends in an equally hostile manner: "Thou wilt wonder that such absurdities have infected the best part of the world, and wilt avouch, that the knowledge of what is contained in this Book, will render that Law contemptible" (Ross 1649: A4r). Bound in at the end of the volume, after the translation, are fifteen densely printed, unnumbered pages entitled 'A needful Caveat or Admonition, for them who desire to know what use may be made of, or if there be danger in reading the *Alcoran*. By Alexander Ross'. Here too the translator makes quite sure his opinion of the original will not be mistaken: "I suppose this piece is exposed by the Translator to the publike view, no otherwise then some Monster brought out of *Africa*, for people to gaze, not to dote upon" (Ross 1649: n.p.). Even more striking perhaps than the image of the (human? animal?) monster is the evocation of the desired reception: the translation is to be gazed upon in wonderment and disgust, an alien body to be looked at from a safe distance, not something that could ever be part of one's own life.

With frames as crude as these, every word in the translation lives under the cloud of the translator's disdain for the original. However, the frame does not have to affect every aspect

of an original. It can be selective and isolate only certain aspects of a foreign text rather than the text as a whole. Not wanting to be seen to harbour sympathies for the Christian ideas in Daniel Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe*, the early twentieth-century Chinese translator Lin Shu commented in his preface:

In the book, there are many descriptions of religious matter. It looks as if the translator is devoted to that religion. This is not true. Translating a book is different from writing one. A writer can express his views freely, and he can write out of his imagination. But when you translate, you are recounting what has happened. How can you put in your own opinions? This book talks about religious matters. How can I, as the translator, avoid them and delete them? I have to follow what was said in the book. (in Wong 1999: 33)

Invoking the translator's ethos absolves him from responsibility for the ideas contained in the text he has nevertheless written. At the same time, readers are informed that whenever religious ideas come up in the story, they should remember the translator's misgivings about them and read those passages not just for what they say but also for what the translator said of them. The appeal to the audience matters in another way too. The translator's expression of his reservations positions him with respect to the values he shares with his audience. It establishes a bond with them. The "we" that was used in the Foreword to *The Speeches of Hitler* above had the same effect, just as Alexander Ross and André du Ryer were obviously projecting themselves as Christians speaking to Christians, thus reinforcing their shared sense of self and community in contrast to the outsiders, the others, the world of alien and objectionable ideas.

Framing is one device for signalling the dissociation from alien and the affirmation of indigenous values. Here is another. As an illustration, let us look at J.M. Rigg's 1903 translation of Boccaccio's *Decameron*. Having reached the tenth story of the third day, in which the hermit Rustico persuades the innocent Alibech to 'put the devil back into hell', the reader encounters this passage:

So, probing her by certain questions, he discovered that she was as yet entirely without cognizance of man, and as simple as she seemed: wherefore he excogitated a plan for bringing her to pleasure him under colour of serving God. He began by giving her a long lecture on the great enmity that subsists between God and the Devil; after which he gave her to understand that, God having condemned the Devil to hell, to put him there was of all services the most acceptable to God. The girl asking him how it might be done, Rustico answered: 'Thou shalt know it in a trice; thou hast but to do that which thou sees me do.' Then, having divested himself of his scanty clothing, he threw himself stark naked on his knees, as if he would pray; whereby he caused the girl, who had followed his example, to confront him in the same posture. E così stando, essendo Rustico più che mai nel suo disidéro acceso per lo vederla così bella, venne la resurrezione della carne, la quale riguardando Alibech e maravigliatasi, disse: "Rustico, quella che cosa è, che io to veggio, che così si pigne in fuori, e non l'ho io?" (Rigg 1903, I: 251-52).

The text continues in Italian for a page and half before it reverts to English. The title page of this edition presents the *Decameron* as "faithfully translated", and indeed it is: the Italian in the scene above has been translated into itself. The Italian in the passage is obviously not just the original text, is the Italian reinstated as part of the translation. The "faithfully translated" accolade is repeated in subsequent editions of J.M. Rigg's translation (1905, 1921, and so on), together with the footnote just before the Italian passage sets in: "No apology is needed for leaving, in accordance with precedent, the subsequent detail untranslated" (*ibid.*).

Rigg's reference to precedent is true enough. The anonymous 1806 edition, "a new edition in which are restored many passages omitted in earlier editions", left passages in Italian and French, while both the anonymous 1822 translation of this story and the 1855 version by W.D. Kelly, for example, left some parts in Italian and offered matching French versions at the foot of the page. A prefatory note in the 1872 translation also says its rendering "will be found

to be COMPLETE, although a few passages are in French or Italian” (McWilliam 1972: 28, 32; Stych 1995: 13). The French in these versions is not contemporary but lifted from the sixteenth-century translation by Antoine le Maçon, including its spelling. This also happens in an 1893 commercial printing of John Payne’s translation of the same passage from the story of Rustico and Alibech:

Accordingly, having sounded her with sundry questions, he found that she had never known man and was in truth as simple as she seemed; wherefore he bethought him how, under colour of the service of God, he might bring her to his pleasures. Et premierement lui monstra avec plusieurs parolles combien le diable estoit ennemy de nostre Seigneur: & apres lui donna à entëdre que le seruice qui plus plaisoit à Dieu, estoit de remettre le diable en enfer, auquel nostre Seigneur l’auoit condenné. La ieunette lui demanda comment cecy se faisoit. A laquelle Rusticque dist : Tu le sauras tantost : & par ce tu feras ce que tu me verras faire. Si commença à despouiller ce peu d’abillemens qu’il auoit vestuz, & demeura tout nud : & autant en fit la fillete ... (Boccaccio 1893, I: 249).

This version too features the usual explanatory footnote, here at the start of the chapter (“It being usual, for obvious reasons, to omit this story, it has been thought well, for sake of completeness, to substitute the French version from the fine sixteenth-century translation of Antoine Le Maçon, secretary to Marguerite de Navarre, authoress of the *Heptameron*”; Boccaccio 1893, I: 247), but at least one other edition slides into Le Maçon’s French without warning (McWilliams 1972: 33).

Actually, the first printing of John Payne’s translation of the *Decameron*, in 1886 and dedicated to Stéphane Mallarmé, had given the full story in English:

Accordingly, having sounded her with sundry questions, he found that she had never known man and was in truth as simple as she seemed; wherefore he bethought him how, under colour of the service of God, he might bring her to his pleasures. In the first place, he showed her with many words how great an enemy the devil was of God the Lord and after gave her to understand that the most acceptable service that could be rendered to God was to put back the devil into hell, whereto He had condemned him. The girl asked how this might be done; and he, ‘Thou shalt soon know that; do thou but as thou shalt see me do.’ So saying, he proceeded to put off the few garments he had and abode stark naked, as likewise did the girl, whereupon he fell on his knees, as he would pray, and caused her abide over against himself.

Matters standing thus, and Rustico being more than ever inflamed in his desires to see her so fair, there came the resurrection of the flesh, which Alibech observing and marvelling, ‘Rustico,’ quoth she, ‘what is it that I see on thee which thrusteth forth thus and which I have not?’ ‘Faith, daughter mine,’ answered he, ‘this is the devil whereof I bespoke thee; and see now, he giveth me such sore annoy that I can scarce put up with it.’ Then said the girl, ‘Now praised be God! I see I fare better than thou, in that I have none of yonder devil.’ ‘True,’ rejoined Rustico; ‘but thou hast otherwhat that I have not, and thou hast it instead of this.’ ‘What is that?’ asked Alibech; and he, ‘Thou hast hell, and I tell thee methinketh God hath sent thee hither for my soul’s health, for that, whenas this devil doth me this annoy, an it please thee have so much compassion on me as to suffer me put him back into hell, thou wilt give me the utmost solacement and wilt do God a very great pleasure and service, so indeed thou be come into these parts to do as thou sayst.’ (Boccaccio 1886, II: 30-31)

Payne had built protective firewalls around this version. The title page confirmed that the volumes were not in the public domain but printed “by private subscription and for private circulation only”. In addition, as the above passage shows, the translator used a peculiar, antiquated diction (“whenas this devil doth me this annoy,” “otherwhat”). Even so, the 1893 printing, which was brought out by a commercial publisher, reverted to the old cautionary habit of sliding into French at the critical moment, despite the fact that both the 1886 and the 1893

printings were limited editions. One reason for the caution in the 1893 edition may have been the outcry a few years earlier over the translations of Emile Zola's Naturalist novels by Henry Vizetelly, who was tried and found guilty of publishing obscene works in October 1888 and again in May 1889 (Fleming 2001: 47).

Rather obviously, all the editorial interventions stem from moral objections to perceived obscenity. The switch from English to Italian or French serves as an index of censure. Assuming the translations are aimed at audiences unfamiliar with Italian and put off by outdated French, readers are coyly being informed of the existence of material deemed unsuitable for them. They are actually shown this material in full, but in a veiled form beyond their reach. Since the run-up to the forbidden passage leaves little doubt as to its nature, readers can let their imagination run riot but must remain uncertain about the detail. The translators for their part have acquitted themselves of their duty, for they offer a complete version, without omission, addition or alteration. But by switching from one language to another they have marked the value conflict and imported into the text their own verdict on what can and cannot be shown. In this way the translator does more than merely reproduce words. A value judgement travels along with them.

There is a further, social aspect to this, bearing on what has become known as audience design. The antiquated diction, restricted distribution and hefty price of John Payne's *Decameron* were evidently aimed at an exclusive audience. His nine-volume 1882 version of the *Thousand and One Nights* too had been produced "by private subscription and for private circulation only" in an edition of just five hundred numbered copies (Payne 1882). Richard Francis Burton's even more outrageous *Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night*, "a plain and literal translation" in ten volumes (with six subsequently added), also "for private subscribers only", had employed a similar protective strategy of exorbitant price, limited circulation and outlandish idiom; this version, he declared in his 'Translator's Foreword', was definitely "not virginibus puerisque" (Burton 1885-88, I: 22). Even the *Decameron* translations that we saw occasionally slipping into Italian or Renaissance French would have remained accessible to that select coterie of readers with a knowledge of these languages. At the time of Henry Vizetelly's first trial for obscenity an editorial in the *Publishers' Circular* noted that especially "the unlettered classes" needed to be protected but that "the cultured man or woman" could read foreign novels in the original language "without harm resulting"; the fact that Vizetelly's company issued translations of Zola in cheap editions had been the main thorn in the side of the National Vigilance Association that brought the case against him (Fleming 2001: 47-48, 57).

The euphemistic recourse to an elite language to cover up licentious or otherwise sensitive passages is historically well documented. In Europe, Latin served this purpose until well into the twentieth century. Françoise Waquet's book on the use of Latin in the post-Classical world mentions, among a host of older examples, a 1953 German translation of tales from the *Arabian Nights* containing a passage in Latin preceded by a note explaining it was too obscene to be rendered in German (Waquet 2001: 250). The *Thousand and One Nights* translator Richard Burton had in 1856 published *First Footsteps in East Africa*, which featured an appendix on the practices of female circumcision printed in Latin (even so, in all but six or so copies the publishers withdrew it and inserted an apology; Woudhuysen 2004: 29). The conspicuously decorous *Thousand and One Nights* that Edward Lane published in three volumes in 1839 assumed an educated reader who, without so much as a line reference let alone a translation, "may remember the well-known line of Virgil – 'Nescio quis teneros oculus mihi fascinat agnos'" (Lane 1839, I: 324). As early as the fourteenth century John Trevisa's English translation of a Latin encyclopedia could write of menstrual blood in general but was unwilling to discuss details of the menstrual cycle in English, making Aristotle speak Latin in the process:

Pis blood is bred in wymmennes bodyes of superfluite of moisture and feblenes of hete [heat]. And for it schulde not greue [afflict] kinde, it is igedred [gathered] into þe modir as filþe into a goter. If it is iput out þerof in dwe maner, it clensith and releueþ al þe body, and clensih þe modir also, and disposih and makeþ able to conceyue.

And *libro 9°* Aristotil seih: menstruum in fine mensis in mulieribus maxime viget, et ideo tunc vtiliter expellitur talis sanguis. Et *libro 16°* dixit quod sanguis menstrualis

non habet certam temporis reuolucionem sed in maiori parte accidit in diminucione lune. [...] (Seymour 1975, I: 153-4)

The use of the device means, however, that social discrimination is written into translations along with the translator's value judgement. Some audiences are entitled to enjoy fruits forbidden to others, and the very wording of a translation can carry this message. At the same time, translators and editors who change languages in midstream or append cautionary prefaces and notes informing readers of omissions and doctored passages evidently anticipate their readers' accommodation in these interventions. The fact that their practices call on an existing tradition of screening and concealment suggests as much, even if we cannot know what individual readers actually thought of them. In this way too cultural affinities and ideological loyalties are being cemented and collective identities constructed. When Stuart Bates reviewed the sanitised Boccaccio versions by John Payne and J.M. Rigg in his 1936 monograph *Modern Translation*, he wholeheartedly approved, although he made allowance for integral translations of the classics if they were aimed at "special publics and students" (Bates 1936: 116-7).

The examples I have discussed illustrate conflicts of value being negotiated and processed in translations. If the values inscribed in a foreign text are felt to be reprehensible, the translation itself may attest to the translator's critical opinion of them even as those values are being reported word for word. This means the translation speaks with more than one voice and its words say more than what they say. The translator both speaks for the original author and signals reservations.

The model outlined in the following pages begins by positing translation as a form of quoting. I will suggest that translation can be viewed as direct speech mixed with elements of indirect speech. This impurity creates the space in which a translator's critical attitude towards what is being translated can be profiled and the concept of irony comes into its own. Viewing translation as reported speech is not new. Roman Jakobson mentioned the idea in his 1959 essay on linguistic aspects of translation (1959: 233), John Bigelow (1978) wrote about it in a way picked up by Anthony Pym (1992, 2004), Brian Mossop elaborated it in two substantial essays (1983 and 1998), Ernst-August Gutt briefly dealt with it (1991) and Barbara Folkart devoted a booklength study to it (Folkart 1991). My particular angle is informed by the kind of value conflicts sketched above. My starting point, the essay 'Quotations as Demonstrations' by the linguists Herbert Clark and Richard Gerrig (1990) also served Brian Mossop (1998) well.

Translation, quotation, demonstration

To convey the way in which someone walks one can describe this person's walk by means of words or show it by acting it out, walking a few steps in the way the other person walks. The difference between the two modes of representation, telling and showing, echoes the Aristotelian distinction between diegesis (telling) and mimesis (showing). Whereas diegesis provides a verbal account of an event and leaves it to the audience to visualise a scene, mimesis creates meaning by physically imitating certain gestures or actions, that is, by mimicking, simulating, aping, demonstrating them. The 'demonstration theory' that Clark and Gerrig (1990) outline in the opening pages of their essay invokes this distinction.

There is no need to go into every corner of Clark and Gerrig's demonstration theory here. It will be enough to recall the features that are most pertinent in view of the argument I want to present. Clark and Gerrig stress, for example, that demonstrations are sequences of actions that are parasitic with regard to one's normal behaviour. They are non-serious, playful, bracketed actions. While pretending to be someone else, the demonstrator temporarily suspends his or her normal behaviour. But simulating another's actions means dissimulating one's own self for the duration of the simulation. In the early seventeenth century Francis Bacon's essay 'Of Simulation and Dissimulation' (in his *Essays* of 1625) described these two aspects of the "hiding and veiling of a man's self" as "simulation, in the affirmative; when a man industriously and expressedly feigns and pretends to be that he is not" and "dissimulation, in the negative when a man lets fall signs and arguments, that he is not that he is" (Vickers 1996: 350). To avoid the risk of confusion between serious and non-serious behaviour, we tend to signpost demonstrations by announcing them in advance and signalling their end to ensure they

are properly bracketed. In trying to capture the ‘as if’ nature of this kind of pretending, John Searle speaks of “nondeceptive pseudoperformance” (1979: 65).

Another point to note is that demonstrations represent their objects selectively. Not all aspects of the action being imitated are represented in the demonstration, and not all aspects of the demonstrative act have an exact counterpart in the original action. I can imitate the tantalisingly slow serve of a left-handed tennis player by pretending to serve a ball equally slowly but holding the imaginary racket in my right hand. Clark and Gerrig call an element like the imaginary racket, which is an essential but non-mimetic ingredient of the demonstration, a ‘supportive’ aspect (1990: 768). Finally, demonstrations depict their referents from a certain vantage point, and they contain a number of elements, such as the demonstrator’s running commentary or the absence of a real racket, for example, which are not part of the demonstration itself and which the spectator is meant to be able to decouple from the demonstration (1990: 764-8).

Now, according to Clark and Gerrig, quotations can be regarded as demonstrations of pre-existing utterances. Like demonstrations, quotations are mimetic in nature, they “depict rather than describe” (1990: 774), and they are usually inserted into a discourse that is not itself a quotation. Quotations, that is, normally occur in a diegetic environment, and they are introduced by a verb like ‘say’ or ‘tell’ (1990: 771). As a rule, we encounter quotations as part of a sentence like:

(1) Yesterday Anna told me: “I’ll get it translated by tomorrow”

The descriptive phrase ‘Yesterday Anna told me’ identifies Anna as the source of the original utterance and is followed by the quotation as object. The quotation itself, as an instance of direct speech, presents Anna’s actual words. The reported discourse is clearly announced in the reporting discourse and set apart from it. In the context of the reporting discourse the quotation constitutes an embedded, second-order discourse. Although it is the object of the main verb, it retains the form of a syntactically autonomous sentence. The quotation mimics Anna’s words but does so selectively. One could imagine tone, rhythm and pitch not being imitated. To the extent also that the quotation signals an earlier utterance it carries a deictic element that is not itself mimetic in nature; in his essay ‘Some Questions Concerning Quotations’ the philosopher Nelson Goodman says that a quotation “names” its referent (Goodman 1978: 42).

Quotations are enunciated by the reporting speaker but they report someone else’s words and, as demonstrations, constitute non-serious actions. This raises questions of detachment and accountability. In normal, diegetic discourse, speakers are expected to accept responsibility for what they say. Clark and Gerrig however argue that the person who quotes is responsible only for the presentation of what is quoted, and then only, in fact, for the presentation of those aspects that were selected for simulation. Responsibility for that which is represented in the quotation rests with the original speaker (1990: 792). The American sociologist Erving Goffman (1981: 144ff., 226ff.) would say that the person mouthing a quotation assumes the role of ‘animator’, the soundbox that merely emits someone else’s words; like a newsreader on radio or television, he or she is responsible neither for the script itself nor for the opinions or positions contained in it. I will return to this point.

Also worth exploring is the question of the point of view that the recipient is offered in a quotation. In example (1) the reporting speaker chooses Anna as the focaliser: in the quotation, Anna’s words are presented to us as Anna spoke them and thus from Anna’s point of view. In the next sentence,

(2) Yesterday Anna told me she would get it translated by today

Anna’s words appear as indirect speech. Here it is the speaker of the sentence who serves as the point of orientation (or the ‘focaliser’) for Anna’s words. As is well known, the shift from direct to indirect speech entails changes in pronouns and deixis. What was ‘tomorrow’ in (1) is now ‘today’, for example. In this formulation the representation of Anna’s words tends towards description more than demonstration, diegesis rather than mimesis: the speaker is telling us about Anna’s words rather than re-enacting them.

If in Erving Goffman's terms the person reporting someone else's words in direct speech could be characterised as an animator, a mere soundbox relaying words that were produced elsewhere, then indirect speech involves the reporter in more than just acting as a conduit. Now the reporter plays an active part in choosing the words that depict the words Anna spoke yesterday. The reporter now shares in the composition of the script. An increased share in writing the script also means increased responsibility for it.

Next, consider the following:

- (3) *She would get it translated by today.*
- (4) *She would get it translated by tomorrow.*

The use of the third person and the conditional reminds us that in both cases Anna's words are relayed to us by the reporting speaker. Both are instances of free indirect speech, marked by the absence of a reporting discourse. This absence makes the sentences ambiguous when they occur in isolation. They require context to be interpreted as free indirect discourse; let us assume the context is the same as it was for (1) and (2). The difference between sentences (3) and (4) is that (3) focalises through the reporter, hence the use of 'today', which is the reporter's here and now. Speaking yesterday however Anna would have used 'tomorrow', and in (4) Anna's perspective and the illocutionary force of her words – her making a promise – have been retained. In this sense (4) is closer to direct quotation as in (1). This makes (4) more depictive, more like demonstration, than either (2) or (3), which foreground the reporter's vantage point and hence reveal a more pronounced descriptive aspect.

Finally, when Clark and Gerrig stress that quotations, like demonstrations, are selective simulations of pre-existing utterance, they also draw the important consequence that quotations do not need to be restricted to verbatim repetitions of earlier utterances. Their claim that indirect discourse may contain both mimetic and diegetic elements already points in this direction. They also regard translations as quotations. In this they disagree with Nelson Goodman, who had considered the following three sentences:

- (5) (a) *Jean a dit: "Les triangles ont trois bords."*
- (b) *John said: "Les triangles ont trois bords."*
- (c) *Jean said: "Triangles have three sides."*

and accepted only (5b), but not (5c), as a translation of (5a). The reason, for Goodman, was that (5c) translated not only the reporting phrase ('Jean said') but also the words between the quotation marks, thus giving the impression that Jean had uttered English words where in fact he had been speaking French (Goodman 1978: 53; neither Goodman nor Clark and Gerrig, incidentally, ask whether 'John' is a translation of 'Jean'.) Goodman insisted that quotations had to be verbatim repetitions containing what he termed "sameness of spelling" with the original words (1978: 43; Clark and Gerrig 1990: 798; we will meet Goodman's term again in the next chapter). He admitted that a French novel translated into English, for example, would put both the narrative and the dialogue into English but regarded this as "something between direct and indirect quotation" (*ibid.*).

Clark and Gerrig, in contrast to Goodman, accept both (5b) and (5c) as translations of (5a). Both (5b) and (5c) report diegetically that Jean said something. The difference between them is that in (5c), assuming the context indicates that John/Jean's language was French, the reference to John/Jean's language is treated as a 'supportive' and hence a non-mimetic aspect of the quotation. But (5c) does as good a job as (5b) in simulating the propositional expression (1990: 777-8, 783-5, 798-9). Clark and Gerrig would also agree that (6) and (7) are quotations:

- (6) *"Je le ferai traduire pour demain," Anna said.*
- (7) *"I'll get it translated by tomorrow," Anna said in French.*

Both sentences report in English the words that Anna spoke in French. Nelson Goodman would recognize the words in inverted commas in (6) as a quotation, but not those in (7). Clark and Gerrig would argue that (6) describes or recounts that Anna said something and then

demonstrates both what she said and that she spoke in French, while (7) recounts or describes that Anna said something and that she expressed herself in French, and then demonstrates the content and the illocutionary force of what she said.

Reported speech

The essay by Clark and Gerrig permits an understanding of translation as quotation, and of quotation as simulation and enactment. It highlights additional aspects of quotations that will prove useful, such as the ways in which quotations tend to be signalled and bracketed to distinguish them from the surrounding discourse, the fact that they offer selective representations, the question of focalisation and the issue of who is accountable for the words spoken.

Let me mention another two approaches that will help to shed light on the grey area between direct and indirect speech. My argument will be that just as quotations are more than verbatim repetitions of someone's words, translation is more than direct speech. It is a form of speaking that partakes of both direct and indirect speech. It is precisely to the extent that the translator is more than just a soundbox or mouthpiece or animator that the translator's subject-position becomes discernible in translations. This subject-position creates room for the expression of an attitude, a precondition for irony.

To develop that argument, I will first pick up Dan Sperber's essay 'Interpretive Ethnography and Theoretical Anthropology' (1985) and then Kristiina Taivalkoski-Shilov's book *La tierce main* (2006). Together with Deirdre Wilson, the anthropologist Dan Sperber invented Relevance Theory in the 1980s. His 1985 essay explores the nature of ethnographic representation, including the representation of an informant's words by the ethnographer. Sperber's terminology differs from that of Clark and Gerrig, but the approaches are compatible in some respects.

Sperber distinguishes, very broadly, between two kinds of representation, descriptive and non-descriptive, roughly in line with the distinction between diegesis and mimesis. I am concerned only with non-descriptive representations. They come in two kinds, which Sperber calls reproductions and interpretations. Reproductions, such as scale models and quotations, exhibit an "exterior resemblance" with their referents (1985: 12). Interpretations are defined, not altogether satisfactorily, as all other kinds of representations, "a vast and residual category" (1990: 13) comprising everything that is not either description or reproduction. Sperber regards direct speech, including quotations, as reproduction. Indirect speech he classifies as interpretation, presumably because it does not exhibit the "exterior resemblance" with a prototype in the way scale models and quotations match their respective objects. Sperber's distinctions and classifications seem debatable, but they are not the main issue in the present context.

Sperber also points out that reproductions, such as photographs or the diagram of a city's metro network, need a "descriptive comment" (1990: 12) which identifies the referent and specifies, explicitly or implicitly, what kind of representation is being displayed. The difference between the descriptive comment framing a representation and the representation itself, Sperber suggests, is clear enough when we are dealing with two distinct media, for instance a verbal caption explaining a picture. The difference however may become blurred when both the comment and the representation are verbal in nature, as is the case with reported discourse. As a rule, the framing comment will make up the main clause. It announces and contextualises the reported words. The representation appears either as an object clause in inverted commas, when we are dealing with direct speech, or, in the case of indirect speech, in a syntactically dependent *that*-clause. The main clause identifies the reporting speaker and specifies the reporting situation. The embedded clause contains the reported speech, that is, the quotation – which, as we know from Clark and Gerrig, includes translation.

Separating reporting from reported discourse is relatively straightforward in the case of direct speech. The transition from the main to the embedded clause is signalled by quotation marks. (Sperber does not consider free direct speech.) By contrast, Sperber argues (1990: 17-18), indirect speech does not always allow us to draw a sharp line between the diegetic and the mimetic, the framing and the embedded discourse, the reporting and the reported speech. They

can become intermingled. The reported utterance may have been subjected to various kinds of condensation, expansion, affect or stylistic polish, and these would have to be attributed to the reporter. Indirect speech, in other words, grants the reporter substantial control over the reported utterance. Moreover, if the original utterance is not available for inspection, the reporter's interventions may be entirely impossible to identify. In an ethnographic account in English, say, the exact words as spoken by a local informant in Vietnamese may no longer be retrievable, even when Vietnamese words and phrases appear in the report.

Free indirect speech makes things even messier. It dispenses with the framing discourse, and there is often considerable uncertainty as to whether an utterance is to be attributed to a reporting narrator or a reported character. As Sperber puts it, free indirect speech "allows the author to tell a story 'from the point of view of the actors,' and the reader to identify with them. The less an identification is conscious, the better it is accepted" (1985: 19).

It seems to me that translation, as a form of mimetic reporting that falls short of verbatim quotation but is not indirect speech either, partakes of several of these categories. It is normally framed as direct speech. The overwhelming majority of written translations adopt the person and vantage point of the original speaker. Conference and court interpreters are routinely urged to do the same. Only in community and informal interpreting is recourse to indirect speech relatively common ("He says he'll have it done by tomorrow"). Nevertheless, even when it is construed as direct quotation, translation gives the translator a degree of control over the choice of wording more like that found in indirect discourse. Perhaps we should anyway think of categories like direct and indirect speech not so much as discrete units but as forming a continuum in which one type shades into another and no type is pure.

Such a sliding scale of different forms of representing anterior speech by means of more or less manipulated, more or less constrained direct or indirect discourse, is mapped in Kristiina Taivalkoski-Shilov's *La tierce main* (2006). The book is primarily a detailed study of the translation of reported discourse between English and French in the eighteenth century, but one more general chapter is devoted to reported discourse as such – that is, without reference to translation (2006: 35-73). Following a discussion of several proposals (by Marguerite Lips, Brian McHale and Geoffrey Leech and Michael Short) for the subdivision and classification of reported speech, Taivalkoski-Shilov offers a continuum that integrates three variables:

- (a) the degree of control the reporter has over the reported utterance, stretching from total to minimal control;
- (b) the syntactic relation between the embedded and the framing utterance, ranging from dependent (in indirect discourse) to autonomous (in direct discourse);
- (c) the shift from a diegetic to a more mimetic mode of representation of the anterior utterance, with an accompanying shift in person and vantage point from the reporter to the reported speaker.

The continuum set up on this basis comprises eight types, each type gradually merging into the next (2006: 54) It is not hard to find or think up parallels in the world of translation:

1 Paralytic résumé, or omission: the reporter refers to the existence of someone's words but omits them. Applied to translation this might be a translator informing the audience that a passage has been suppressed. The audience is told of its existence but does not get to see it. Edward Lane's chaste version of the *Thousand and One Nights* is full of such messages: "The story here alluded to is inserted in the original; but, being extremely objectionable, and too short and simple to be abridged, I have been compelled to omit it altogether"; "I here omit an explanation which is of a nature to disgust every person of good taste"; "Here, in the original, is introduced a character of a disgusting description, and unnecessary to the carrying on of the story." "This story is followed by sixteen anecdotes [...]; eleven of which I translate, and here insert"; "A portion of my original I here omit"; "In the original are a few introductory words, which I omit because they are inappropriate" (Lane 1839, I: 517; II: 237, 320, 497, 637, 404; Borges 2004: 96)

2 Diegetic résumé: the reporter's summary of someone's discourse. Edward Lane again: "The foregoing is somewhat abridged" (1839, II: 223). In his Dutch translation of Justus

Lipsius's Latin *De constantia*, published in the same year as the original (1584), Jan Mourentorf summarises the content of three chapters ("het inhouden van ieghelijck Capittel int kort verhaelt", Lipsius 1948: 52) which he reckons the common reader will find too hard to read in full.

3 Diegetic report: a report of someone's words but using the reporter's vocabulary and register. A translator abbreviates a particular text or passage in his or her own words, and informs the audience of this. As mentioned above, this is not infrequent in dialogue interpreting. An interpreter may turn to a client and summarise several sentences by saying: "She says she will definitely deliver by tomorrow".


4 Indirect discourse: a full representation of someone's words but in largely diegetic form, that is, mostly using the reporter's vocabulary and tonality. Only some aspects of the reported discourse are depicted rather than described. An interpreter may turn to a client and report a single brief sentence as: "She says she will definitely deliver by tomorrow".

5 Mimetic indirect discourse: a form of indirect speech which retains the register and stylistic physiognomy of the reported discourse. In dialogue interpreting the interpreter might say: "She says she'll definitely deliver by tomorrow, that's a promise, hand on heart".

6 Free indirect discourse: a mimetic representation of someone's words but without a reporting discourse framing it. This would be a translation that is recognisable as a translation but is not announced or labelled as one. In dialogue interpreting, for example, a situation might arise in which it is not clear whether a sentence like "she'll definitely deliver by tomorrow, that's a promise" is in fact the interpreter's own diegetic statement of the import of the interlocutor's words or the interpreter issuing a more depictive but still third-person representation while leaving out the introductory "She says (that)...".

7 Direct discourse: the mimetic representation (in Clark and Gerrig's terminology: a demonstration; Dan Sperber would speak of a reproduction) of an anterior discourse, usually in quotation marks, and embedded in a reporter's framing diegetic course but syntactically autonomous. This is the standard form of a quotation. Following Clark and Gerrig in regarding translations as quotations, this would be the prototypical translation. It takes the form of a translator declaring that *x* said something in language *y* and then, shifting person and vantage point from translator to translated speaker, presenting the actual translation.

8 Free direct discourse: direct discourse but lacking the framing main clause. In literature, the best known example is interior monologue in which words or thoughts are reported but there is no 'she said' or 'he thought'. In the world of translation this is a standard translation but without a frame identifying the text as a translation: in other words, a text that is a translation but conceals this fact. In the media and in some commercial translating this is not uncommon. Hope Inslow's novel *The Miser*, published in London in 1868, is a translation of Hendrik Conscience's *De gierigaard* of 1852, but the latter's authorship and the original title are not mentioned (as the online British Library catalogue will confirm). A variant on this would be a translation which plagiarises another translation: such a text advertises itself as a translation of a text in another language but omits to mention it is quoting an already existing translation.



Paralipitic résumé	Diegetic résumé	Diegetic report	Indirect discourse	Mimetic indirect discourse	Free indirect discourse	Direct discourse	Free direct discourse
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Table 1: Continuum of reported discourse (based on Taivalkoski-Shilov 2006: 54)

A diagrammatic representation of Taivalkoski-Shilov’s types of reported speech might look like *Table 1*. The partitions between the different types are porous to mark gradual transitions. The reporter’s or the translator’s control over the reported discourse may be total, as in the case of complete omission (paralipitic résumé), but at the other end of the scale it is not zero. As Clark and Gerrig stress, even verbatim repetition is selective and contains non-mimetic elements. Translation adds to this the change of language, which leaves the translator in charge of selecting the new wording.

Translation, as the retrieval and representation of an anterior discourse, can be viewed as a form of quotation. In this view the translator is a reporter who simulates, re-enacts, reproduces the reported discourse mimetically. That makes translation a form of direct speech, with, as a consequence, limited to minimal reporter control over the reported words. However even a simulation contains a deictic aspect, which we attribute to the simulator. The matter is complicated further, first, by the selectivity of the representation, which again reveals the simulator’s agency, then by the problem of clearly separating the mimetic apart from the diegetic, and thirdly, and most importantly, by the fact that in interlingual translation the words we encounter are unmistakably those of the translating reporter. If translation was pure direct speech, the translator would be what Erving Goffman’s ‘production format’ of utterances calls an ‘animator’, as we saw above. Responsibility for composing the script makes the translator into what Goffman terms an ‘author’; the term is a little unfortunate in our context, but it indicates a larger measure of involvement and accountability (Goffman 1981: 144-5, 226).

The result of these complications is a degree of ambivalence as to exactly whose voice and viewpoint receive articulation in a translation. Perhaps translation is therefore best cast as a mimetic representation animated by the translator’s vision and to a significant extent under the translator’s control. Translation then becomes a form of direct speech affected, or infected, by indirect speech. The semiotician Susan Petrilli puts it the other way round, calling translation “*indirect discourse masked as direct discourse*” (2003: 22; her emphasis). The syntactic autonomy of translation in relation to the framing discourse and the ensuing shift in personal pronouns suggests to me the approach via direct translation is preferable. Either way the centre of gravity of translated discourse seems to lie between or across an impure direct and an equally impure indirect speech. The ambivalence of this speech situation creates the necessary room for irony.

Like translation, irony is an ambivalent type of speech, one which creates distance from itself and leaves the recipient unsure whether or to what degree the speaker assumes responsibility for the words he or she utters. Stable forms of irony are normally embedded in a framing co-text which signposts the irony and brackets the ironic utterance (Booth 1975). In the case of translation the phrase or label identifying the text as a translation is sufficient to put the translated words between inverted commas. As suggested in the previous chapter, a translator’s preface will usually add to this by clarifying the speech situation. Whereas a translation which appears without the announcement that it is a translation may be read as free direct speech (for example, an unattributed translation, in other words a case of cross-lingual plagiarism) or not as a translation at all, the announcement framing a translation has essentially the form

I say that x said in language y: “zzz”

The main clause provides the descriptive comment; it is the caption accompanying the reproduction, and is followed by the mimetic reproduction. The frame – the preface, the label ‘translation’ – is the main, contextualising clause. The actual translation is the quotation, an

embedded if syntactically autonomous clause. As reported speech it cannot help being affected by the clause in which it is embedded, as indeed Mikhail Bakhtin already saw (1981: 340).

Insofar as the translator's preface continues to resonate in the translated discourse, it reminds us of the divided, impure, multivocal nature of translations. More voices than one thus make themselves heard in a translation, even if the ideology – that is, the social and historical construction – of translation strives to neutralise or silence this multiplicity. The standard admonitions to the effect that translators should not speak in their own name, should disappear behind their authors, should not interfere, should render the original, the whole original and nothing but the original, all seek to preserve translation as undifferentiated, monologic speech. To achieve this they reduce translation to direct discourse pure and simple, to verbatim quotation, casting the translator merely as mouthpiece, animator, ventriloquist. In contrast to this view I suggest an image of translation as direct speech contaminated by indirect speech, an impure mix of direct and indirect discourse in which several simultaneous voices have a stake. The margin between frame and enactment contains the potential for dissonance as well as consonance.

Echoic translation

Among the countless definitions of forms of irony that are in circulation, I have adopted the one offered by Relevance theory because it seems clear-cut, manageable and amenable to translation. In their book on *Relevance*, Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson describe irony as a second-order phenomenon, the interpretive representation of an existing representation. Irony plays when a speaker signals (a) that he is referring to an existing utterance or opinion, (b) that he has a certain attitude towards it, and (c) that this attitude is relevant (1986: 238-9). Irony is distinguished by the fact that the speaker distances himself from the opinion or words referred to. Appreciating irony requires that the hearer or reader recognise the reference and the speaker's critical attitude. Let us take a closer look at the Relevance view of irony.

In a series of essays and exchanges, Sperber and Wilson (1981, 1998; also Wilson and Sperber 1992) have characterised verbal irony as a form of 'echoic utterance'. An echoic utterance is a subcategory of interpretive utterances. This latter term invokes a widely used distinction, that between interpretive and descriptive utterances. As already explained in Chapter One, the descriptive use of language means the deployment of language to make statements about the world. In contrast, language is used interpretively when it represents another utterance or thought which it resembles either in linguistic expression or in propositional content, as is the case with reported speech. Since an utterance is itself a representation (of a thought or a state of mind), an interpretive utterance offers a representation of a representation and is therefore a second-order or meta-representation (Noh 2000: 74; Sperber & Wilson 2004: 621). Translation, too, is metarepresentational to the extent that it is recognised as the interlingual representation of another utterance.

For Sperber and Wilson an echoic utterance is an interpretive utterance which derives most of its relevance from the dissociative attitude which the speaker tacitly signals with respect to the represented discourse. What makes an utterance echoic is the fact that the speaker indicates a belief about the represented utterance, and that this belief is dissociative, distancing, disapproving, mocking or skeptical in nature (Sperber & Wilson 2004: 621-2). The belief or attitude is not linguistically encoded, but left to the hearer to infer on the basis of various paralinguistic signals (Noh 2000: 94). The notion of 'echo' in this context is deliberately broad. It covers not only direct and immediate echoes as in reported speech, for instance, but also echoes of attributed thoughts and of norms or standard expectations (Sperber & Wilson 1998: 284).

For the hearer or reader it is important to recognise (a) that the utterance in question represents another utterance or thought, (b) that the speaker has a dissociative attitude towards the represented utterance or thought, and (c) that this attitude is relevant. In Sperber and Wilson's words, "irony comprehension requires second-order metarepresentational abilities" (2004: 622). The advantage of thinking of irony as 'echoic' is that it emphasises the interplay of two discourses, one echoing and the other echoed, that is, a representing or reporting discourse

on the one hand, and a represented or at least attributed discourse or thought on the other. This makes it easier to apply the concept to translation.

Like translation, all irony is intertextual. Ironic intertextuality always has a critical edge. Some translations, as we saw with reference to both the *Mein Kampf* and the *Decameron* translations, display a similar edge. This means however that if translation is understood as reported speech, it is this critical edge that makes the translator rather more than either an ‘animator’ or (also in Goffman’s terminology) an ‘author’. An echoic translator, a translator with an attitude, assumes responsibility for the critical opinion he or she expresses and is therefore what Goffman calls a ‘principal’. With responsibility come agency and accountability, and the ethical consequence that translators are accountable for the attitude they convey.

Most discussions of irony assume that irony begins with the ironist’s intention to be ironic. They also tend to assume that irony consists in saying one thing and meaning the opposite. It is one of the merits of Linda Hutcheon’s *Irony’s Edge* (1995) that it adds nuance to these views.

Hutcheon agrees that irony must be spotted if it is to work. If the recipient does not pick up what Sperber and Wilson call the echoic element in an utterance, the critical attitude being expressed will not register. At one point in his *Le Ton Beau de Marot* Douglas Hofstadter writes an innocent-looking passage which he reveals in the next chapter to have been written in what he calls ‘Anglo-Saxon’, a form of English that, in the style of the Oulipo group and Georges Perec, dispenses with the letter ‘e’; when I first read the passage I failed to catch the oddity and hence both the joke and the allusion (Hofstadter 1997: 94-5, 105-6). However, Hutcheon argues that it is enough for a reader or hearer to attribute ironic intent to a speaker for irony to be activated, regardless of whether the intent is really present or not. We normally attribute irony to a speaker on the basis of certain signals, which may be textual, intertextual or contextual (Hutcheon 1995: 143ff.). The standard signal is a *pronunciatio*, an explicit announcement that irony is afoot. This could be a change in intonation, a facial expression, a cough or, in written text, the use of typographical devices such as dashes or italics. The absence of a clear signal may run the risk of an ironic utterance being taken at face value and coming across as absurd or deceitful. In handbooks of classical rhetoric, irony is classified as a figure of both *simulatio* and *dissimulatio* (Plett 1979: 93-99), and, as we saw, both simulation and dissimulation have something in common with translating, quoting and demonstrating. Conversely, something may be taken as a signal of oncoming irony when no such signal was intended; or, in the absence of a signal, something may be read as ironic even though no irony was meant. When the Hong Kong-based journal *Renditions* was set up in 1973 to promote Chinese literature in English translation, the editors could not know that thirty years later the word ‘renditions’ would enter world news as the term for covert CIA operations translating terrorist suspects to a gulag of secret prisons. In February 1842 the young Karl Marx sent to a journal in Dresden a vigorous piece denouncing censorship. In his covering letter he already expressed concern that “the censor might censor my censure”, and indeed the article was promptly banned (Mehring 1966: 33; Wheen 1999: 36). No doubt Marx appreciated the censor’s unintended irony. The article appeared a year later in Switzerland.

Irony operates in a speech situation in which what is said evokes something that is left unspoken. This difference, the margin between the said and the unsaid, the spoken and the intimated, forms part of the ironic utterance. Hutcheon quotes Paul de Man in this context. For de Man, irony, like allegory, operates when “the sign points to something that differs from its literal meaning and has for its function the thematization of this difference” (Hutcheon 1995: 64; de Man 1983: 209). The editorial scaffolding Alvin Johnson’s team built around Helmut Ripperger’s translation of *Mein Kampf* in 1939 means that the translation itself, as reproduction of Hitler’s words, points to something different from its literal meaning, namely to criticism of Hitler’s ideas, and consequently the translation has for its function the thematisation of the difference between reproduction and criticism. The translation is echoic in that it both re-enacts Hitler’s discourse and dissociates itself from the words being uttered. Irony allows the ironist – here: the translator – to resist the assimilation of his own and the ironised discourse and, in so doing, to contest the latter’s authority and to undermine its persuasiveness – a non-harmonious relation prefigured in Bakhtin’s ‘Discourse in the Novel’ of 1934-5 (Bakhtin 1981: 339ff.).

Just as Hutcheon regards the attribution of ironic intent as stemming from the receiver, she also stresses that irony consists less in saying the opposite of what one appears to be saying than in saying two things at the same time, both the said and the unsaid, while, crucially, highlighting the difference between them. Equally crucial is that the difference between the said and the unsaid reveals a particular attitude; here Hutcheon is entirely in agreement with Sperber and Wilson. In uttering words and signalling that they echo other words or opinions and that the difference between the two series is relevant, the speaker conveys an evaluative stance, a critical judgement about the words being uttered. Irony involves speakers dissociating themselves from what they are saying, and this act of distancing springs from a critical value judgement. Stacking an unspoken discourse on top of the ostensible discourse suggests a subject that does not coincide with the talking head. Irony plays precisely in the space between face and mask.

Irony, then, requires a knowing audience. It appeals to some, while others will just not get it or remain unaware of its operation, and their exclusion may well be intentional (Hutcheon 1995: 97). In this way irony sheds light on the relation between speakers and their audiences. As an example, Hutcheon mentions Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* of 1621: the book is in English, but the sexual innuendoes in it are in Latin. Only the cultured elite, that is, would fully grasp the sexual references, readers without Latin could only see that something was being withheld from them and guess at what it might be (Hutcheon 1995: 97). Indeed in Part 3 Section 2 of the *Anatomy*, Member 1 Subsection 2, for example, on homosexual love, and Member 2 Subsection 1, on the effects of eating "lascivious meats", contain extended passages in Latin (Burton 1994, 3: 55-57, 63-5). This is, of course, the situation we encountered in the Boccaccio translations that shifted into Latin or Early Modern French when sexual overtures threatened to become graphic.

Devices like these ratify certain groups of recipients and exclude others. In that sense they actively engage in audience design. The addressees able to cope with the Latin passages in Burton's *Anatomy* or the English Boccaccio translations were the cultured elite who had done Latin at school and kept it alive. The more exquisite their enjoyment of the bawdy detail, the greater their appreciation of the good reasons why common readers should be denied access. Those common readers would be auditors at best, or more likely overhearers – while we, reading these passages today, are eavesdroppers on communicative exchanges not addressed to us.

These distinctions, and terminology used to name the different types of audience, derive from the work of Alan Bell, who in turn builds on Erving Goffman (Bell 1984; Hatim & Mason 1997: 83; Mason 2000). Bell classifies receivers (hearer, readers) according to whether or not (a) their presence is known to the speaker, (b) the speaker acknowledges them as ratified participants in the speech event and (c) they are being directly addressed. Addressees are known to be present, they are ratified participants and directly addressed. Auditors are known to be present and ratified but not directly addressed. Overhearers are known to be present but neither ratified participants nor addressed. Eavesdroppers are neither known to be present nor ratified nor addressed. *Table 2* lists these categories in diagrammatical form.

	Presence known to the speaker	Ratified participant	Directly addressed
<i>addressee</i>	+	+	+
<i>auditor</i>	+	+	-
<i>overhearer</i>	+	-	-
<i>eavesdropper</i>	-	-	-

Table 2: Audience design (after Bell 1984)

The identity construction engaged in by the *Decameron* translators who have recourse to Italian, Latin or French to veil objectionable scenes is socially selective. While overtly addressed to all who can read and purchase or borrow the books, the foreign-language passages speak to common readers only to deny them the status of ratified participants. At the same time the translator appeals to the common readers' understanding of this tactic: while lewd scenes

can be unveiled for a morally robust élite, more often than not a moneyed intelligentsia, for everyone else it is sufficient to be alerted to the proximity of the lewd without being able to view it. This discriminating reticence is assumed to serve the common good. The consensus being sought in this way affirms not only shared values and narratives but, through these, a social order. And it is relevant to note that, in switching languages as a form of gatekeeping, translators (or editors, or whoever makes the relevant decision) align themselves with the social elite. They were evidently able to inspect the obscene close up; having done that, they made the decision to restrict access to the cultured class and expected the lower orders to accept being shut out.

The positioning that translators engage in is a dialogic, collaborative process in a differentiated social context. Just as the unfolding of a discourse entails the creation – and on the recipient’s part the recognition – of a subject-position, the interaction between speakers and recipients locates participants in jointly produced story lines, shared narratives that shape collectives, maintain distinctions and secure values (Davies and Harré 1990: 48). When Pierre Letourneur translated Edward Young’s *Night Thoughts* into French in 1769, he explained in his preface that he was offering his readers an integral version (“la traduction entière”) but had nevertheless cut back some of Young’s nauseous repetitions and omitted some passages that were no more than Protestant ravings against the Pope; as for a couple of other “fanatical lines,” these, he said without any visible sign of ironic intent, he had actually crossed out in the original (“deux vers fanatiques [...] que j’ai rayés de l’original que je possède”; D’hulst 1990: 115). All of this he does as a writer who feels part of his nation and contributes to a national literature (“ma nation”, “notre littérature”, *ibid.*).

Translators position themselves as they convey attitudes through their translations. Irony conceived as echoic utterance provides a handle on this. Let me give one further example. In 1720 the Dutch writer Balthasar Huydecoper translated Pierre Corneille’s *Oedipe*. In the preface (Schoneveld 1992: 76-81) he explained that he has followed the French closely except for a few minor alterations – which ones, and where, we are left to guess. One passage of eighteen lines, he went on, had been substantially modified. It concerned fate, free will and good works. Huydecoper’s preface first translated the eighteen lines in full and then reduced them to six, adding that the reader would surely appreciate the reasons for the change. To Huydecoper’s Dutch readers they will indeed have been obvious: Catholic dogma about free will and good works could not find a place in Calvinist Holland, and so, yes, those references had to be filtered out. The six lines duly reappeared in the actual translation of the play but by then the reader would have been aware that they contained a large dose of diegetic résumé. They may have recalled the lines that might have been there but had, for obvious reasons, to be reshaped. However, different constituencies in the Dutch Republic would have looked differently upon the obviousness of the reasons. The dominant Calvinist community could hail Huydecoper as one of them and a pillar of society; the Catholics who were excluded from public office were confirmed in their subsidiary role.

Six years later Huydecoper published a translation of the *Satires* of Horace. This was a version in prose. Had he used verse, he explained, he would have had to write Dutch satires and that would have meant targeting his own contemporaries. Prose allowed him to let Horace himself speak. But Huydecoper realised that letting Horace himself speak in translation would mean adopting Horace’s viewpoint. He therefore added a general warning, drawing a parallel between a traveller to distant lands and the reader of a documentary translation:

If someone who is not yet fully conversant with the traditional customs or with those things that are considered proper and necessary in his own country, travels to foreign lands, how often do we not see such a person adopting any and all customs that he comes across, to the extent even that, having returned to his native country, he may be regarded as a stranger among his own people? He who delves into Heathen Writings without first having armed himself with the knowledge of the pure truth is such a person. [*Begeeft zich iemand, die noch geen begrip heeft van zyne vaderlyke zeden, noch van datgeene, dat in zyn vaderland als welvoegelyk aangemerkt, en daarom noodzaakelyk geschat wordt, naar andere landen; hoe dikwils zienwe, dat zulk een alle zeden aanneemt, die hem voorkomen; zelfs zo, dat hy, in zyn vaderland wedergekeerd*

zynde, onder de zynen als een vreemdeling kan aangezien worden? Zodanig een is de onderzoeker van Heidensche Schriften, die zich niet eerst gewapend heeft met de kennis der zuivere waarheid.] (Huydecoper 1726: xix-xx)]

The danger Huydecoper perceives is that of going native among pagans. Because a strongly mimetic translation, being close to quotation and direct speech, assumes the original speaker's vantage point, impressionable readers could be enticed by the discourse they are reading. Huydecoper's preface urges detachment and adequate preparation on the part of readers who should not confuse the translator's persona with his personal stance. When in the translation itself the translator speaks for Horace he is only enacting Horace and does not himself mean what he says. Readers are meant to realise this and to appreciate the difference between the mimetic actor and the diegetic mediator. During the act the simulator leaves his own views unexpressed, but due to the diegetic frame these views constantly harass the translated words. This is what makes the words echoic. As a result, the actor's statements are transformed into quasi-statements, safely wrapped in quotation marks. The translation becomes self-reflexive and the translator Janus-like: the person observes the persona, and the persona knows. At the same time the construction contrives to project the translator as one whose faith is firm enough to withstand the confrontation with alien beliefs, and hence as a morally safe pair of hands and a trusty guide.

Approaching translation as a complex form of quoting makes it clear that translation matters, socially and historically, not only because it transmits cultural goods but because it transmits them under a certain angle, with evaluation attached.

Echoic speech is a slippery thing. It may be strongly or mildly critical, it may concern aesthetic as well as ideological or other issues, it may be more or less clearly announced, it may or may not be correctly ascribed or recognised. The critical or dissociative attitude may concern other translations and translators, or modes of translating, or certain aspects of modes of translating. This suggests that the line between a dissociative and a neutral attitude, and that between a neutral and an associative attitude, may sometimes be hard to draw. In fact, it may be better not to think of clear distinguishing lines between different kinds of attitude at all, but of gradations shading into one another. The attitude may not only be more or less pronounced, it may affect different aspects of the translated texts to different degrees. The total subjection of Barents's *MeinKampf* and the wholesale rejection in evidence in the American *Mein Kampf* version edited by Alvin Johnson's team are points at opposite extremes; but then, *Mein Kampf* is hardly a typical book.

Working back in this way, and allowing the idea of echoic translation to reverberate back into the model, we can see that echoic translating, or translating with a dissociative attitude, is only a special case. The more general phenomenon is that of translating with an attitude. The translator's attitude frames and invades the performance of translation. The theoretical model creates room for it to the extent that it casts translation as not purely mimetic but as containing a diegetic element, as not purely direct speech but as containing elements of indirect speech as well. It is precisely to that extent that the translator is not a ventriloquist or a mouthpiece but an agent with views and opinions. In other words, if it is true that translation is not pure direct speech and that the translator is not purely an animator, it becomes possible to argue that echoic translation is merely one end of a cline that comprises different kinds of value judgement written into all translating.

The particular case of echoic translation conveys disapproval of and critical detachment from what is being translated. If the judgement is not critical, it can still range from neutral to supportive. Considered in this light, the reluctance to express a view also entails a view, just as neutrality is a position one can choose to take. In Francis Bacon's essay 'Of Simulation and Dissimulation' the first stage, before "simulation, in the affirmative" and "dissimulation, in the negative", is what he calls "Closeness, Reservation, and Secrecy", as when a person keeps his own counsel or plays his cards close to his chest, and thus "leaves himself without observation, or without hold to be taken, what he is" (Vickers 1996: 350). The non-interference routinely urged in translators' and interpreters' codes of conduct reflects this conscious choice. Still, the voice that chooses to keep silent communicates this choice through its silence. Equally, the reserved translator or interpreter who positions him- or herself on the

sidelines of a communicative exchange takes a position, conveys this position to the participants and anticipates their understanding of the reasons why this position is being taken. As the Hainan Island incident that I mentioned in the previous chapter suggested, the translator's attitude may be directed at something in the original text but it may also concern his or her own role and responsibility as a translator. The Hainan Island interpreter may well have felt that, had he rendered the Americans' ambiguous "we are very sorry" in Chinese as either regret or apology, he would have been seen by his own side either as unnecessarily prolonging a conflict (if he had translated "sorry" as 'regret, for 'sorry' can after all be taken as apology as well) or as disloyally letting the Americans have the last laugh (by pretending to ignore the ambiguity in their statement and giving it as 'apology' when he knew perfectly well they were not really apologising). By leaving the American "sorry" in English, he also kept his distance from the statement and allowed ambiguity to continue to colour the relations between the two countries. In the same way, endorsement of what is translated, whether expressly stated or left to be pieced together from paratexts and extraneous evidence, also springs from a value judgement, as Steven Barends's loyal rendering of *Mein Kampf* showed.

In all these cases the attitudes frame but also inform and subtend the actual translation. Attitude, then, applies across the board, to routine professional as well as to ideologically motivated translating. In accepting a request or a commission translators may indicate that they agree with the import of what they are about to translate, that they remains indifferent to it, or indeed that financial gain overrides other considerations. This attitude is written into the resulting product and remains separate from the translation's representational aspect. For this reason, attitude and position-taking cannot be written out of the picture of what translators do. All translating is translating with an attitude. It could not be anything else, since all translations contain the translator's subject-position.

Formally, then, translation has the structure of ironic discourse. It has an evaluative attitude built into it, this attitude is inscribed in and comments on the actual translation, and the difference between the two is relevant. Establishing the difference may be an analytical procedure, and in that sense the model can be made operational, as the present chapter will hopefully have shown. Perceiving the difference is also a matter of recognising the translator's ethical and social responsibility. While translators may disclaim responsibility for the re-enactment of someone else's discourse in the form of direct speech, they can be held accountable for the diegetic aspect of their mimesis. The decision to translate, the presentation of the enactment and the value judgements that inform the performance are theirs.

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