Translation, Equivalence and Self-Reference

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1. The End
   Words from above
   Vienna's treaties
   Versions of authority
   Authentication in a minor key
2. Before the End
   Hostile dynasties
   Self-reference
   Metatranslation

1. The End

Let us begin with a series of remarkable events. They unfolded in a place called Palmyra, in a far corner of New York State, just south of Lake Ontario. There, on the evening of 21 September 1823, a quiet Sunday, a young man named Joseph Smith, a farmhand then aged just eighteen, received an unexpected visitor. Joseph Smith had never seen this person before. The stranger, a tall, bearded man, wore a long white robe, and his presence filled the room with light. Looking more closely, Joseph noticed that the visitor's bare feet floated approximately twelve inches above the ground. Joseph had experienced the occasional vision before, but he had never seen this. The visitor was an angel. Speaking the universal angelic language, the angel introduced himself in English as Moroni and engaged the young farmhand in conversation. He informed him of the existence of an ancient book written on gold plates, and of 'seers' prepared by God for its translation. The book, he declared, contained "the fullness of the everlasting Gospel" and "an account of the former inhabitants of this continent" (Hill 1977: 57). On departing Moroni assured his host that he would return in due course to direct him to the gold plates, which were buried in a nearby hill.

Moroni paid Joseph Smith several more visits in the next few years, each time bringing the same message. Then he announced the time had come. In the early morning of 22 September 1827, following the angel's directions, Joseph Smith dug up and carted home a pile of gold plates that had been stowed in a stone box in a hill called Cumorah (in Manchester, New York). The plates were made of thin gold leaf and could be rifled like the pages of a book. They were later estimated to have weighed around sixty pounds. They were embossed with text in a hitherto unknown script which bore a passing resemblance to both Hebrew signs and Egyptian hieroglyphs. At this time, the late 1820s, Egyptian hieroglyphs had not yet been properly deciphered. In France the founding father of Egyptology ,Jean-François Champollion, had made his first breakthrough in 1824 working on the recently discovered Rosetta Stone. He was appointed professor of Egyptology at the Collège de France in Paris in 1826 and would spend the rest of his short life (he died in 1832, aged forty-one) compiling his great Egyptian grammar and dictionary.

Joseph Smith was luckier. As the angel had predicted, he found two stones buried together with the gold plates. They were small, transparent, three-cornered diamond-like stone disks mounted in loops of metal wire. These were the 'seer stones' or 'interpreters' Moroni had spoken of and even given names, Urim and Thummim, terms which also occur several times in the Old Testament (Exodus 28, 30; Deuteronomy 33, 8; Ezra 2, 63 and another four places). By placing the transparent stone disks on his nose like a pair of glasses (or, as some accounts have it, under his hat), Smith would be able, to his own amazement, to read the script on the gold plates, and therefore to translate it.

Having brought the plates home, Smith kept them hidden, as Moroni had instructed him to do. He began to translate late in December 1827. Speaking from behind a screen to shield the plates from his companions' gaze, he initially dictated to his wife Emma, then to two friends and followers, Martin Harris and Oliver Cowdery. Some time in the spring of 1828 Harris took 116 translated pages away to show his sceptical family, who promptly lost or possibly destroyed them. The angel severely rebuked Smith and instructed him not to retranslate the lost pages.

Two years later the translation of the book, a weighty tome, was ready. By then Joseph Smith had gathered round him a number of disciples. In June 1829 the most faithful among them witnessed two more apparitions of the angel Moroni during which they were allowed to see and touch the gold plates for the first and last time. Afterwards all signed statements confirming what they had witnessed. They also confirmed that during Moroni's visitation a voice descended from heaven assuring them that the book was true and the translation accurate (Brodie 1945: 77-9; Bushman 1984: 107; Hill 1977: 91-2). The volume appeared in print in Palmyra in March 1830. The title page mentioned Joseph Smith as "Author and Proprietor", but this was probably for copyright reasons; the designation was later changed to "Translator". Smith's loyal friend and disciple Martin Harris first mortgaged and then sold his farm to cover the costs of printing five thousand copies.

Together with the Christian Bible the book became the foundational text of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, also known as the Mormon Church after the *Book of Mormon* as translated into English by Joseph Smith. Mormon, the main prophet whose life and work is chronicled in the *Book of Mormon*, was also the father of Moroni, who appeared to Smith in the guise of an angel. The Mormon Church grew rapidly in the 1830s, despite hostility from local people. Joseph Smith was murdered in Carthage, Illinois, in June 1844. Some years later his successor, Brigham Young, led the growing Mormon community to Salt Lake City, Utah. Today the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, with its headquarters still in Salt Lake City, numbers approximately twelve million worldwide and runs a vast business empire as well as the world's largest genealogical archive. The *Book of Mormon* is available online for all to read.[1]

Words from above

The Museum of Mormon Church History in Salt Lake City has a manuscript page from Joseph Smith's English version of the *Book of Mormon* on permanent display. I have seen this page. It is written in a rather elegant longhand and, remarkably for a translation, shows not a single deletion or correction. As I pored over this unusual artefact and wondered about its pristine state, a helpful museum attendant came up to me ("Are you interested, sir?") and explained that Smith dictated his translation virtually without hesitation, guided as he was by "the gift and the power of God", as indeed the title page of the *Book of Mormon* has it, and also by Urim and Thummim, the two 'seer' or 'interpreter' stones which enabled him to read, understand and render into fluent English the otherwise incomprehensible signs on the gold plates.

The fate of the gold plates is also of interest. It is directly connected with the pronouncement that determined the status of Joseph Smith's translation. During the two final visitations of the angel Moroni in 1829, when Smith's earliest disciples were granted sight of the gold plates, a voice from on high announced that the book was true and the translation accurate. In the words of one witness, David Whitmer: "While we were viewing [the plates] the voice of God spoke out of heaven saying that the Book was true and the translation correct" (Hill 1977: 91). The divine utterance authorised the translation to serve in place of the original. This is what subsequently happened. At the end of the session the angel Moroni took the plates under his wing and vanished with them. They have not been seen since. However, this need not worry us. We know that we possess a wholly adequate translation, equivalent to the original. As a result, we no longer need recourse to the original. The translation has replaced it, totally.

The heavenly pronouncement only confirmed what the miraculous nature of the translation's creation already intimated. A version helped along by "the gift and the power of God" must be correct. In this respect the story of the *Book of Mormon* shows similarities with that other remarkable tale, that of the origin of the Septuagint.

The Septuagint was produced in the third century BCE on the orders of the Egyptian king Ptolemy Philadelphus for the Greek-speaking Jewish community in Alexandria. Accounts of its creation differ. Most agree that seventy-two translators completed the task of translating the Jewish Bible in seventy-two days. According to the oldest account, the so-called 'Letter of Aristeas' (probably written around 130 or 100 BCE), the translators took great care to compare notes and consult among themselves as they composed their Greek text. When the version was complete and found to be accurate in every respect, it was ordained that no-one should presume to alter it in any way. Indeed the king, upon being presented with the scrolls, recalled that several individuals who had earlier translated parts of the Holy Book too rashly, had been punished by God with bodily afflictions.

[1] http://scriptures.lds.org/bm/contents

According to the most influential account of the Septuagint, that recorded by Philo of Alexandria (also known as Philo Judaeus) around the beginning of the Christian era, the translators worked independently of each other, in separate cells. After seventy-two days they emerged with identical Greek texts (Schwarz 1955: 17-44). This astonishing feat, seventy-two identical translations of a long and complex original, could only be explained as the product of divine inspiration. God's spirit had breathed the one correct rendering in each translator's ear. Philo is emphatic that under divine guidance the translators "arrived at a wording which corresponded with the matter [of the original], and alone, or better than any other, would bring out clearly what was meant" (Schwarz 1955: 23).

Saint Augustine, like most of the early Christian theologians except Jerome, appears to have accepted the supernatural origin of the Septuagint. In *On Christian Doctrine* (*De doctrina Christiana*, probably written *ca*. 416-19 CE) he still allowed for the possibility that the translators consulted among themselves, but his major work, *The City of God* (*De civitate Dei*, written 410-28), favoured the more miraculous account. Here Augustine argued that "in truth there was the one Spirit at work in them all" and that "the same one Spirit was manifestly present in the scholars when without collaboration they still translated the whole in every detail as if with one mouth (1972: 820, 822). He also perceived a reason for this divine intervention: "this was the purpose of their receiving such a marvellous gift of God; that in this way the authority of those Scriptures should be emphasized, as being not human but divine" (*ibid.*). As a result, the Septuagint translators were freed of "the servile labour of a human bond-servant of words" (Augustine 1972: 821; Schwarz 1955: 41).

The accounts of the creation of the Septuagint and the *Book of Mormon* oblige us to assume that in each case the relation between translation and original is one of full equivalence. In each of these texts the translator and the originary speaker speak with the same voice, intent, force and authenticity. As a result, no dissonance or interpretive difference opens up between original and translation, and the translator, as the producer of the secondary discourse, nowhere utters a thought or occupies a subject-position that is not wholly consonant and indeed identical with that of the first speaker. The first three witnesses who were present during the angel Moroni's visitation in June 1829 stated that they heard the heavenly voice declare: "These plates have been revealed by the power of God, and they have been translated by the power of God" (Bushman 1984: 106). Augustine wrote likewise in *The City of God* that the Septuagint had been achieved "by he power of God," and "the very same Spirit that was present in the prophets when they uttered their messages was at work also in the seventy scholars when they translated them" (1972: 821; Schwarz 1955: 41). The translation, that is, can speak for the original. It can effectively replace the original.

On this point the *Book of Mormon* is rather more emphatic than the Septuagint. The *Book of Mormon*'s gold-plated original has literally disappeared without trace. We also have an explicit statement, a revelation straight from heaven, affirming the translation's unique quality and complete adequacy, granting it full authority to speak for and even in lieu of its original. This makes the *Book of Mormon* the most dramatic example I know of a translation which is not only promoted to fully equivalent rank with its original but has so totally occupied the latter's place as to hide it from view once and for all. Joseph Smith's version has pushed Mormon's scriptures into irretrievable obscurity, overwriting them wholesale.

There are two aspects of these stories which need elaborating. The first bears on the notion of equivalence. The accounts of the origins of the *Book of Mormon* and the Septuagint suggest that equivalence, understood as equality in value between a translation and its original, comes about as a result of verbal statements concerning the relation between the texts involved. The statements, as speech acts, possess performative force. Both in the case of the *Book of Mormon* and of the Septuagint the initial assumption is that a translation, as a text seeking to echo a pre-existing text, is not automatically put on equal terms with the original to which it refers. Putting both texts on the same footing, lifting one up to the other's level of authority by means of a verbal utterance, constitutes a performative speech act. In the case of the *Book of Mormon* the intervention takes the form of words falling from the sky: the book is true and the translation correct. The statement instigates the equivalence between Joseph Smith's translation and the encrypted gold plates. This equivalence is total, as the disappearance of the gold plates demonstrates. Because the two versions can each stand for the other, one can also render the other redundant, and has done so. The story of the Septuagint lacks the apodictic enunciation and subsequent disappearing act that make the *Book of Mormon* so spectacular, but it, too, relies on a divinely inspired origin to lever itself up to a state of equivalence with the Hebrew Bible. Philo of Alexandria speaks of the Greek and Hebrew versions as "sisters, or rather as one and the same, both in matter and words" (Schwarz 1955: 23). Augustine implored Jerome to use as the source

for his Latin translation of the Bible, not the original Hebrew of the Old Testament but the Greek Septuagint, adding that any translator who insisted on working from the Hebrew would still be right only if he came up with a version that was in agreement with the Seventy (1972: 821; Schwarz 1955: 41).

Equivalence, which I will continue to interpret as meaning equality in value and status, is not a feature that can be extrapolated on the basis of textual comparison. Rather than being extracted from texts, equivalence is imposed on them through an external intervention in a particular institutional context. In other words, equivalence is proclaimed, not found. As we will see below, the proclamation is effective only if the conditions are right. Moreover, a translation raised to equivalent status with its original will necessarily be recognised as a correct representation of it, indeed it is of necessity the only correct representation. This explains why Moroni forbade Joseph Smith to re-translate the 116 pages which Martin Harris's family had allegedly mislaid or destroyed. A new translation would run the risk of throwing up divergent renderings and these would undermine the claim of divine inspiration if the Harris family were acting in bad faith and intended to entrap Smith by producing the initial translation at a later date. With reference to the Septuagint the 'Letter of Aristeas' mentions that after the translation of the Seventy had been presented and approved, an imprecation was pronounced on any who dared add, omit or alter anything at all in the Greek text (in Robinson 1997: 6).

Equivalence does not preclude differences in meaning. Augustine knew perfectly well that a close comparison between the Greek Septuagint and the Hebrew text of the Bible disclosed numerous divergences. He accounted for them most ingeniously by claiming, in *The City of God*, that if there were things in the Greek that were not in the Hebrew, God had wanted to say those things only in Greek; if there was anything in the Hebrew that was not in the Greek, God had wanted to say those things in Hebrew only; and if the Greek and the Hebrew said different things, God had wanted to say all those things, but some only in Greek and others only in Hebrew (Augustine 1972: 821-2; Schwarz 1955: 41-2). For Augustine, the Septuagint and the Hebrew Bible were fully equivalent authentic versions of the same message. God spoke with equal force, with equal directness and with equal authority in each version.

Relevance theory distinguishes between descriptive and interpretive use of utterances. Descriptive utterances are statements about the world, and they may be true or false (for example, "it is raining"). Interpretive utterances are statements that represent other statements, and they are judged by their degree of resemblance to those other statements (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 224-31; Wilson and Sperber 2004: 621). Ernst-August Gutt has used this distinction as a basis for his view of translation as interpretive use (Gutt 1991). With respect to the *Book of Mormon* and the Septuagint, we see the distinction collapsing, or, better perhaps, becoming irrelevant. For all we know, Joseph Smith's English resembles Mormon's script, but we cannot ascertain or measure the resemblance and so we read the *Book of Mormon* descriptively, not interpretively. And if God speaks with equal force in the Septuagint and in the Hebrew Bible, then the Greek may well resemble the Hebrew, but we may as well read either, for we can hear the divinely inspired word directly in both.

This takes us to the second aspect that needs highlighting. In these cases of wholesale equivalence, the translations have to all intents and purposes ceased to be translations. A translation which is declared to be, and is recognised as being, in all respects equal to its prototext, may well continue to be a translation in a genetic sense but it no longer functions as such. The user is now confronted with two wholly and exactly corresponding authentic texts embodying a single underlying intention. Talking of the Septuagint and Hebrew versions of the Bible, Philo of Alexandria suggested we should "speak of their authors not as translators but as prophets and priests of these mysteries" (Schwarz 1955: 23). It may have been accidental but it certainly was no less symbolic that Joseph Smith was first entered as 'author and proprietor' of the *Book of Mormon*.

Vienna's treaties

Nowhere do we see this practical and radical consequence of the positing of equivalence more clearly at work than in the very different, modern, juridical context of the Convention of Vienna. Delving into this topic means a change of scene as we switch from religion to international law.

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is a United Nations convention first enacted in 1969 and revised in 1986. It deals with international treaties, including bilateral and multilateral treaties involving more than one language (Blix and Emerson 1973; Reuter 1995: 210-43; Sinclair 1984). A bilingual or multilingual treaty constitutes a single legal instrument, but it consists of versions in different languages. The texts of such a treaty may have come into being as a result of

parallel drafting in two or more languages, or it may be that a version in one language was agreed by all parties to the treaty and then translated into the other language or languages. Article 33 of the Vienna Convention concerns the interpretation of treaties that have been 'authenticated' in two or more languages. It runs as follows:

> *Article 33 Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages*
> 1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.
> 2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree.
> 3. The terms of a treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text.
> 4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted. (Reuter 1995: 261-2).[2]

Authentication is the key concept. It is defined earlier in the Convention, in Article 10, as a procedure that indicates that the text of a treaty is the correct and authentic one. Authenticating the different language versions of a bilateral or multilateral treaty means recognising each version as equally authentic, so that each version is on a par with the other version or versions. An authenticated version of a treaty is consequently "a version which the parties to the treaty have officially approved and recognised as an interpretive source equivalent to such other language versions as there may be" (van den Hoven 1998: 40; *een tekstversie van een verdrag die officieel door de verdragspartijen is vastgesteld en erkend als kenbron, gelijkwaardig aan de eventuele andere taalversies*"; my translation).

In other words, when a treaty has been produced in different language versions, whether by means of translating one initial version or by simultaneously drafting parallel versions, the treaty-concluding parties authenticate these various texts by recognising each individual version as equivalent to the other versions. The recognition takes the form of an institutional act, a performative speech act which posits and thereby creates "the fiction of total equivalence and correspondence" (*ibid.*) between the various parallel texts. The individual versions are declared to be equivalent, and therefore identical in meaning. This is exactly what paragraph 3 of Article 33 (above) of the Convention states: "The terms of a treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text."

There are several things to be noted here. Firstly, authentication, the establishment of the principle of equal authenticity, is a precondition for the different versions of a treaty to be recognised as constituting a single legal instrument. Authentication grants each authentic text equal force of law. It bestows authority on texts. The Septuagint and the *Book of Mormon* invoked divine intervention to bring this about. In the world of international law, authentication is a pronouncement that carries legal force.

Secondly, since authentication makes something happen by means of words, it constitutes a performative speech act, more particularly what J.L. Austin called a perlocutionary speech act, one that achieves an effect (Austin 1962). Following Austin's original classification of performatives, the authenticating speech act would be an 'exercitive', "a decision that something is to be so, as distinct from a judgement that it is so" (Austin 1962: 154). As a speech act, it will succeed only if the felicity conditions for its success are fulfilled. Treaties are binding only if the correct procedures have been followed, and they oblige only the treaty-concluding parties. Not everyone outside the Mormon Church will feel the story of the gold plates and seer stones directly affects them, and few nowadays accept the miraculous account of the Septuagint. Authentication works best in strongly institutionalised environments, such as judiciaries and churches. In the context of international agreements it will normally be part of the felicity conditions that texts presented for authentication cannot be the work of translators alone but that the negotiators themselves must take responsibility for their phrasing.

Thirdly, authentication creates the "fiction of total equivalence and correspondence". The imposition of equivalence has as a consequence the presumption that the various authentic

[2] Articles 31 and 32 deal with the 'General rule of interpretation [of treaties]' and 'Supplementary means of interpretation', respectively.

versions convey the same meaning. Umberto Eco has described translation as “saying almost the same thing” in another language (*Dire quasi la stessa cosa*, Eco 2003); authenticated versions, not being translations, all say *exactly* the same thing. It would appear, then, that authentication has a double effect. It makes two or more parallel texts equally authentic; and in so doing it creates the presumption of sameness of meaning between these texts. Although the two effects come about simultaneously, the former takes precedence over the latter. Equality of status instigates coincidence of meaning. The causal connection runs one way and not the other. It is not the observation that texts can be said to have the same meaning that leads to the conclusion of equivalence. Rather, equivalence is primarily a matter of status and only secondarily of semantics or use value. Also, by creating the fiction of total equivalence and correspondence, authentication asserts the notion that collectively the different language versions constitute a single document or, in the case of international agreements and treaties, a single legal instrument.

Fourthly, if one or more versions of a treaty have come into being as a result of a process of translation from one initial version, authentication erases the memory of this process. Upon authentication, translated texts become authentic texts and must forget they used to exist as translations. In fact, authentication strikes not only translations with amnesia, but also originals. If versions that were once translations are now parallel authentic texts on a par with all other versions, then the version that once served as the original is now also one authentic version among the other authentic versions that are its equals. Where there are no translations there are no originals – unless all are agreed to be originals. Nor, as we will see shortly, are there translators. It also follows from this that, unlike translations, parallel authentic versions are not metatexts that refer to one another. They speak in unison, and they are presumed to say the same thing, but they do not speak about each other. Each speaks for itself, without claiming to represent one or more of the others in the way translations represent their originals. Despite the similarity between them, parallel authentic versions offer instances of what Relevance theory calls descriptive rather than interpretive use.

Fifthly, because an international treaty represents an agreement concerning specific issues referred to by means of particular words, there will be only one authenticated version of that treaty in each language. In the same way there could be only one version of the Septuagint and only one version of the *Book of Mormon*.

Sixthly, when differences in meaning between authenticated versions of a treaty are detected, the discrepancies must be resolved by appealing to the common intent of the treaty-makers. They emphatically must not be resolved by retracing the history of the different language versions. If some versions have originally come into existence as translations of a prototext in a given language, drawing on this knowledge in interpreting the treaty would privilege a particular language version over the others. Such privileging would jeopardise the principle of equality and hence the equal authority of all the other parallel authentic versions. That move is therefore not allowed. Articles 31 to 33 of the Vienna Convention provide the judiciary with rules of interpretation designed to safeguard the parity between the various authenticated versions. Indeed paragraph 4 of Article 33, which I quoted above, stipulates that in the case of divergences “the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted’ (Reuter 1995: 261-2). This is in line with the view of the International Law Commission (set up in 1948 under United Nations auspices), which holds that the unity of multilingual treaties and of each of their terms “is safeguarded by combining with the principle of the equal authority of authentic texts the presumption that the terms are intended to have same meaning in each text” (in Sinclair 1984: 148-9). It comes uncannily close to the way in which Augustine accounted for the discrepancies between the Septuagint and the Hebrew Bible when he argued that both were imbued with the same spirit and voiced the same intent. The rules of interpretation stipulated by the Vienna Convention also show, however, that while the total equivalence and correspondence in meaning instituted by authentication may be a fiction, this fiction is a legal reality that has force of law. It permits some readings and prohibits others.

Finally, if some versions of a treaty have come about through a process of translation and they are not authenticated, they remain translations, and merely translations. Uncertainties or disputes concerning the interpretation of such a treaty will be resolved with reference to the officially recognised authentic version or versions, not with reference to a translation. A translation, that is, simply cannot have the same force of law as an authentic version. In this sense authentication makes a sharp distinction between authentic versions and mere translations.

The relevance of the concept of authentication lies in the conferral of authority. If different language versions of a treaty are authenticated, granting them equal force means recognising the equality in status of the treaty-concluding parties. Authenticating only one among several language

versions privileges that version and the speakers of its language. The procedure of authentication thus addresses a much more general issue, the inequality between languages and communities. This issue obviously predates the Vienna Convention. As early as the first century CE the Roman writer Valerius Maximus observed in his *Memorable Doings and Sayings* that Roman magistrates would invariably insist on using Latin in their contacts with their Greek counterparts, obliging the Greeks to speak through interpreters, not only in Rome but in Greece and Asia also, as far as Roman imperial control extended. The Roman practice served as a reminder to the Greeks that "in all matters whatsoever the Greek cloak should be subordinate to the Roman gown" (Valerius Maximus 2000: 38-39).

Versions of authority

Authentication, as the proclamation of equivalence, can take different forms. In the case of the Septuagint, the entire account of its creation as told by Philo of Alexandria serves to authenticate the Greek version. The story of the *Book of Mormon* is very similar, but features the additional twin moments of the voice from heaven and the physical removal of the gold plates. In bilingual or multilingual legal instruments the authenticating statement tends to occur in the texts themselves, so that the specific agreement confirming that the various language versions of the single instrument enjoy equal status forms part of the broader agreement that is recorded in the document as a whole. Authentication then takes place, and equivalence takes effect, the moment the various parties sign the relevant documents.

The constitutions of bilingual or multilingual countries offer perhaps the clearest illustrations of this kind of authenticating statement embedded in the actual texts. For example, the Canadian Constitution Act of 1982, Article 52 of which proclaims it "the supreme law of Canada", states in Article 57 that "The English and French versions of this Act are equally authoritative". The French version states likewise that "Les versions française et anglaise de la présente loi ont également force de loi", the only inconsequential difference between the two versions being that the English mentions English first and the French puts French first (Canada 1982). The idea was not new in 1982; the Canadian High Court upheld the principle of linguistic equality for legal purposes as early as 1935 (Lavoie 2003: 122).

The Belgian Constitution, in its current incarnation fixed in 1994, exists in three language versions, as its Article 189 confirms in each language:

> Le texte de la Constitution est établi en français, en néerlandais et en allemand.
> De tekst van de Grondwet is in het Nederlands, in het Frans en in het Duits gesteld.
> Der Text der Verfassung ist in Deutsch, in Französisch und in Niederländisch festgelegt.
> (Belgium 1994)

When Belgium gained independence in 1830 the only language used for legal purposes was French. Although from 1898 onwards Belgian laws were drafted and promulgated in both Dutch and French, the Dutch version of the Belgian Constitution was not granted full legal status until 1967 (Brouckaert 1998: 33). The German text of the Constitution is of even more recent date, 17 February 1994. We can be certain that the Dutch was translated from the French and the German from both the Dutch and the French, nevertheless neither the Dutch nor the Geman versions are translations. While genetically they may have been translations at a certain stage, legally, as texts of the Belgian Constitution, they are not and cannot be, because of the principle of linguistic parity. All three are authentic texts, each version on a par with the other two.

International treaties and conventions involving several languages follow the same pattern. The practice has a history and, in Europe at least, appears together with the emergence of nation states and their national languages. During negotiations in 1682 between France and the Holy Roman Empire in connection with the French annexation of Strasbourg, French delegates are said to have asserted for the first time the principle that no sovereign state can impose a particular language on another and that each therefore has the right to use its own language of government, unless agreement can be reached on the use of a common tongue. Indeed a French *Mémoire* of 20 June 1682 insisted that "it appears reasonable among equals to agree for that purpose on one common language, or to make several originals" (Ostrower 1965, 1: 290-1; "il est raisonnable entr' égaux de convenir pour cela d'une langue commune, ou de faire plusiers originaux", Brunot 1966, 5: 444-5).

The Treaty of Rome of 25 May 1957, which created the nucleus of what is now the European Union, states that is was "drawn up in a single original in the Dutch, French, German and

Italian languages, all four texts being equally authentic" (Article 314 in the consolidated version of 24 December 2002; Rome 1957). The Accession Treaty of 25 April 2005, by which the then twenty-five European Union member states agreed for Bulgaria and Romania to join the Union, undoubtedly came into being in the two new languages as a result of translation, but it now exists in a single original in twenty-three languages, as Article 6 confirms:

> This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish languages, the texts in each of these languages being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Italian Republic, which will remit a certified copy to each of the Governments of the other Signatory States. (European Union 2005)

In the same way the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide stipulates in Article 10: "The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic; shall bear the date of 9 December 1948' (Blix and Emerson 1973: 256).

However, in many cases not all the relevant language versions of a multilingual treaty are assigned equal status. When this is the case, the treaty will normally specify which versions are authentic and which are to be regarded as translations. The various Geneva Conventions of 1949, for example, which regulate the treatment of prisoners, of the wounded and of civilians in times of war, declare the English and French versions to be equally authentic, and make provision for official translations into Russian and Spanish.[3] Clearly, as far as interpretation and authority are concerned, authentic versions take precedence over translations, official or not. Only the authentic versions determine what the agreement actually says. Thus, political power and prestige are reflected in the choice of authentic language or languages of bilateral or multilateral agreements. The 1957 Cultural Agreement between Japan and Pakistan was "done in duplicate in the English language at Karachi", and the 1958 Air Services Agreement between Sweden and Sudan was likewise "in the English language, which shall be the authoritative language", with provision for an official translation into Swedish and Arabic. The Peace Treaty of 1958 between Indonesia and Japan was "[d]one in duplicate, in the Japanese, Indonesian and English languages" but added that "[i]n case of any divergences of interpretation, the English text shall prevail" (Blix and Emerson 1973: 254, 256).

The differences in status can be subtle. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (in the Paris text of 1971) was drawn up "in a single copy in the French and English languages" with "official texts" in Arabic, German, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish (Article 37); however the document goes on to say that "[i]n case of differences of opinion on the interpretation of the various texts, the French text shall prevail" (Berne 1971). Only exceptionally is the original language of drafting made relevant. The 1955 Protocol Amending the Warsaw Convention of 1929 was signed at The Hague "in three authentic texts in the English, French and Spanish languages" but added that in the case of any inconsistency "the text in the French language, in which language the Conventions was drawn up, shall prevail" (Blix and Emerson 1973: 256). In this case authentication appears not to have been absolute; I will return to this below.

The so-called 'Unequal Treaties' are a series of treaties forced upon China in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the wake of military defeats inflicted by Western powers. They obliged China to cede territory, open up ports, pay indemnities, allow foreigners to remain outside its jurisdiction, admit Western missionaries, and a host of other things. The Treaties of Tientsin which China signed with a number of countries between 1858 and the mid-1860s, emphasise time and again the difference between authoritative authentic versions and mere translations, almost invariably privileging the language of the victors.

The preamble to the treaty which Britain signed with China on 26 June 1858 sounds lofty enough:

[3] Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Article 55; Second Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Article 54; Third Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Article 133; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Article 150 (Draper 1958: 136, 148, 181, 215).

> Victoria, by the Grace of God, Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc., etc., etc., […] Whereas a Treaty between Us and Our Good Brother the Emperor of China was concluded and signed, in the English and Chinese languages, at Tientsin, on the Twenty-sixth day of June, in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty-Eight […]. (China 1908: 212)

Even the cordial reference to "Our Good Brother" may be a backhander: traditionally, foreign ambassadors were required to kowtow before the Emperor. Although both English and Chinese are explicitly recognised as the languages in which the treaty was concluded and signed, Article 50 leaves no doubt at all as to which language will take precedence should a dispute arise over the meaning of the treaty:

> All official communications addressed by the Diplomatic and Consular Agents of Her Majesty the Queen to the Chinese Authorities shall, henceforth, be written in English. They will for the present be accompanied by a Chinese version, but, it is understood that, in the event of there being any difference of meaning between the English and Chinese text, the English Government will hold the sense as expressed in the English text to be the correct sense.
>
> This provision is to apply to the Treaty now negotiated, the Chinese text of which has been carefully corrected by the English original. (China 1908: 226)

The treaty with France, signed on 4 July 1858, stipulates that only the French text is authoritative (China 1908: 604). Treaties with other countries vary in their language provision. For example, the treaty with the United States, dated 18 June 1858, is in English and Chinese and says nothing about language, so we may assume both versions to be equally authoritative (China 1980: 509-31). The treaty with Denmark has a preamble and conclusion in Danish but is otherwise in English and Chinese; it stipulates that "in the event of there being any difference of meaning between the English and the Chinese text, the Danish government will hold the sense as expressed in the English text to be the correct sense", and adds that this provision "applies also to the present Treaty, copies of which, both in the English and the Chinese languages, will be signed and sealed by the Plenipotentiaries of the two High Contracting Parties" (China 1908: 1043, 1058). The treaties with the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium (signed in 1863, 1864 and 1865, respectively) are in Chinese and Dutch, Spanish and French respectively, and declare that each side regards the version in its own language as authoritative; that with Belgium adds that "the Chinese translation has carefully been made to accord with the French original" ("la traduction chinoise a été rendue soigneusement conforme au texte original français", China 1908: 761).

The treaty with Russia, signed as early as 12 June 1858, is unusual in being in Russian, Chinese and Manchu, with the Russian being accompanied by a French translation ("as published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs") and the stipulation that "the Manchu text will be used as a basis for interpreting the meaning of the articles" of the treaty ("le texte Mantchou sera adopté comme base pour l'interprétation du sens des articles"; China 1908: lvx). The treaty with Germany, of 1861, is in German, Chinese and French and declares that all three versions have "the same sense and meaning"; interestingly, it goes on to say that, since every diplomat in Europe knows French ("mit Rücksicht darauf, dass die Französische Sprache unter allen Diplomaten Europa's bekannt ist"; "par la raison que la langue Française est connue de tous les diplomates de l'Europe"), the French version will be regarded as the original; it adds that, if there is any difference of interpretation between the German and the Chinese versions, the French version will be authoritative ("s'il y a quelque part une interprétation différente du texte Allemand et du texte Chinois, l'expédition Française fera foi"; "wenn eine verschiedene Auslegung des Deutschen und Chinesischen Vertrages irgendwo stattfinden sollte, die Französische Ausfertigung entscheidend sein soll", China 1908: 845-5).

While various multilingual treaties may play out the political inequality between languages, the versions that enjoy equal status are equivalent and are therefore presumed to have the same meaning. Is this the end of the matter? Hell, no. Authentication and its effects are clear enough in principle. They enable multilingual treaties and contracts to appeal, in Jacques Derrida's words, to "a transferability already given and without remainder" ("une traductibilité déjà donnée et sans reste", Derrida 1985: 185, 229). Practice may be somewhat murkier. Occasionally, opinions are voiced in favour of 'historical interpretation', which would take the drafting process of a multilingual agreement into account in determining its meaning (Ostrower 1965, 1: 483ff). And there was also Waitangi, with plenty of remainder.

The historical interpretation was invoked, for example, in a case discussed in Ian Sinclair's *The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties* (1984). The case concerns a dispute which arose in 1980 about the meaning of the terms "depreciation" (English), "dépréciation" (French) and "Abwertung" (German) in the trilingual London Debt Agreement. When the matter went to legal arbitration the Tribunal upheld the principle incorporated in Article 33 of the Vienna Convention against the earlier practice of referring to the basic or original text as an aid for interpretation. However, there was also a dissenting minority view, held by three of the seven judges serving on the Tribunal, that reference to the original drafting language may sometimes be valid, especially when different language versions prove incompatible. The minority view pointed out that, in the particular case of the London Debt Agreement, it was the negotiators who had agreed the English-language text, while the other language versions were produced afterwards by mere translators (Sinclair 1984: 150-2).

The Treaty of Waitangi presents an altogether different case (Waitangi s.d.; Fenton and Moon 2002, 2004). One of New Zealand's foundational documents, it was signed in 1840 by William Hobson as the representative of the British Crown and by over five hundred Maori chiefs. It has been disputed up to the present day. William Hobson drafted the original English text and had it translated into Maori by the Anglican missionary Henry Williams. On 5 February 1840 Hobson and the Maori chiefs all signed the version in their language, so that, although no formal authentication appears to have taken place, this was effectively what happened. The differences in interpretation which subsequently arose concerned concepts like sovereignty and possession of land. The British understood – and intended – the treaty to secure British sovereignty over the territory, whereas the Maori read the corresponding term in their version of the treaty as meaning powers of governance only. References to 'possession' of land did not fit Maori conceptions at all, since land could not be owned; their corresponding term indicated control and authority, without implying a commodity to be owned or traded. In this case, then, even if both the English and Maori versions of the treaty are regarded as equally authoritative, it seems hard to establish a common intention that could serve as a basis for interpreting the treaty as a single instrument. Because the British and the Maori inhabited different conceptual worlds, their negotiators were talking at cross-purposes and neither side grasped the import of the other's terms. Insofar as discrepancies in interpretation resulted in dispute, the solution would be a matter of superior force. Whites began to outnumber Maoris in New Zealand in the 1860s, and only the English version of the treaty was implemented by successive governments. This continued to be the case until the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975 (Fenton and Moon 2002: 42). The two different language versions of the Treaty of Waitangi may well have been nominally equal but power imbalances, cultural disparities and possibly cunning contrived to make one version take precedence over the other.

Still, the principle of authentication remains unaffected by these counterexamples. The tribunal that heard the London Debt Agreement case found ultimately in favour of the idea that translations, once authenticated, cease to be translations. In the case of the Treaty of Waitangi it could be argued that the two versions were nominally equal, even if in fact the power differential was such that one version effectively prevailed. In recent decades a more equitable view of the relation between the two versions emerged after all.

Authentication in a minor key

Authentication is a strong concept, and especially in its legal definition and context it refers to a clear-cut procedure resulting in concrete effects. Authentication confers authority and instigates equivalence. Translations that are authenticated cease to be translations and become authentic texts. In what follows I want to explore several weaker forms of authentication. Translations may be partially authenticated, or they may have a degree of authority bestowed on them without being fully authenticated. There are also situations in which the distinction between translation and original is simply no longer relevant and a form of authentication has occurred *de facto*.

The Council of Trent offers an instance of partial authentication of a particular Latin version of the Bible. The Council, convoked by Pope Paul III and held from 1545 to 1563 in the northern Italian city of Trento, initiated the Catholic response to the Reformation. Its canons and decrees reaffirmed Catholic doctrine; it also fixed the Tridentine mass and created the Jesuits as a militant order to combat Protestantism and other heresies. The fourth of the Council's twenty-five sessions took place in April 1546 and concerned the canonical scriptures. It had to decide which Biblical texts, and which version or versions, to accept as authoritative. It came down in favour of Jerome's Latin Vulgate:

> Moreover, the same holy council considering that not a little advantage will accrue to the Church of God if it be made known which of all the Latin editions of the sacred books now in circulation is to be regarded as authentic, ordains and declares that the old Latin Vulgate Edition, which, in use for so many hundred years, has been approved by the Church, be in public lectures, disputations, sermons and expositions held as authentic, and that no one dare or presume under any pretext whatsoever to reject it. (Schroeder 1978: 18)

As well as proclaiming the Vulgate "authentic" (*authentica*, Rice 1985: 185) the Council went on in the next paragraph to warn that no one should presume to interpret the scriptures "contrary to that sense which holy mother Church, to whom it belongs to judge of their true sense and interpretation, has held and holds" (Schroeder 1978: 19), thus reserving to itself the exclusive right to interpret the scriptures. In this way the Council secured both the text and its reading: only one version could be authentic, and only the Church was entitled to explain what it meant.

The Council members did not deny that the Vulgate was a translation and did not seek to undo its status as a translation, although they came close. They observed that the Vulgate was to be preferred above other versions as being the most ancient, the most used, the least biased, and also "as representing more correctly the state of the ancient copies of the Greek and Hebrew Scriptures than any other Latin version, or even, probably, than any other then, or now, existing Greek or Hebrew edition" (Waterworth 1848: lxxxix). This was a strong claim, but it operated purely at the level of philology. However, the Franciscan Andrés de Vega, of the University of Salamanca, immediately grasped the implication. He interpreted the decree which recognised the Vulgate as 'authentic' as thereby asserting that it was free from all errors against faith and morals, but not from such imperfections as are incidental to all translations (Waterworth 1848: xci). After the Council the influential cardinal and sometime inquisitor Robert Bellarmine repeated, in a book on the subject (*De editione Latina vulgata*…, not published till 1749), that "there is no error in this translation in matters pertaining to faith and morals" (Rice 1985: 187). This view managed to have it both ways. The Vulgate remained a translation, vulnerable to error and not on a par with the divinely inspired original, but it was in the full sense of the word 'authentic' in respect of substance and doctrine, that is, in every respect that mattered as far as the Church was concerned. In these respects the Vulgate was more than a mere translation. Not surprisingly, occasional claims were also made at the time to the effect that the Holy Spirit had assisted Jerome in translating doctrinal matter but had left him to his own fallible devices "in places of less moment"; these views however did not become official Church doctrine (*ibid.*).

Self-translation bestows authority in ways similar to authentication. The phenomenon is well documented, especially in the literary domain, where bilingual authors like Vladimir Nabokov, writing in Russian and English, and Samuel Beckett, in English and French, have often been studied. The issue here is not primarily whether bilingual writers are really equally at home in two languages or not, or how closely self-translations match their originals. Brian Fitch argued in his study of Beckett (Fitch 1988) that the issue is ontological. Works translated by their own authors do not refer back to their originals in the way translations do. Rather, they share a common authorial intent with these originals. As a result, according to Fitch, translations and originals end up as parallel productions which generate independent critical discourses in each language. Elizabeth Klosty Beaujour concluded her study of bilingual Russian émigré writers by stressing the equality of original and translation when the latter was a self-translation. She celebrated self-translation as affording "the Mephistophelian pleasure of creating two mutually orbiting works in dynamic equilibrium"; she added that the voice addressing the reader in these self-translations "is unmistakably the same in both languages, and this very fact indicates that it emanates from a self which must exist *below* both languages" (Beaujour 1989: 175, 176).

The ontological perspective is not enough, though. It needs to be supplemented with institutional considerations, for only they effectuate the social valorisation of self-translations. When works are translated from one language into another by their own authors, both texts are recognised as emanating from a single source and, as a consequence, invested with equal authority. Some self-translating authors seek to give symbolic expression to this equality in status. Karen Blixen, for example, the author of *Out of Africa* who wrote in both English and Danish and translated much of her own work from her adopted language, English, into her native Danish, made strenuous efforts to have British, American and Danish editions of her books appear on the same day and with similar-looking covers. She also sought to revise the original English texts of some of her works on the basis of her own Danish renderings of them (Anderson 1997: 173-4). Both moves promote a view of parallel versions on a par with one another or even coalescing into a single work existing in two language versions simultaneously, in the way the different versions of a multilingual

treaty or constitution make up a single legal instrument. Brian Fitch's examination of Beckett's self-translations closes in similar vein with the "tantalizing mirage" of parallel texts which together form a virtual work that does not exist in either language (1988: 138).

However, whereas in the context of international law authentication prompts the corollary that parallel versions have the same meaning, this point is not pushed in the case of self-translation. Instead, the assumption of a common intent underpinning different language versions is particularly prominent. In addition, the author-translator's sole ownership of both texts ensures that the restrictions which convention or copyright law may have placed on translation, fall away. This makes it hard for readers and critics to decide how to label these products, as the standard distinctions between creative and reproductive writing appear inappropriate. The Galician writer Suso de Toro translated some of his own novels into Spanish and added some twenty pages on one occasion, subsequently incorporating them into the original Galician version (Santoyo 2004: 230). Nabokov incorporated a story first written in French ('Mademoiselle O', 1936) into his autobiography (*Conclusive Evidence*, 1951), which was written in English and which he subsequently adapted into Russian (*Drugie berega*, 1954), only to rework this Russian text again in a second English version (*Speak, Memory*, 1966) (Grayson 1977: 10-11; Beaujour 1989: 112-14).

For some authors self-translation proves an impossible task all the same, despite prodigious linguistic skill. The Greek-born Swedish-language writer Theodor Kallifatides, for example, finds himself incapable of translating his own work and reckons he thinks and feels like a different person when he uses a different language (Qvale 2003: 73). The Irish poet Nuala Ní Dhomhnaill is perfectly at home in English but does not self-translate because he does not see himself as a poet in that language (in de Courtivron 2003: 88-89). As a result, the question of parallel versions enjoying equal authority does not come up in these cases, even though Ní Dhomhnaill insists on bilingual editions of translations of his poems (*ibid.*).

The originally Czech writer Milan Kundera represents the opposite case. He moved to France in 1975 and became a French citizen in 1981, began to write in French, personally amended the French translations of all his Czech books between 1985 and 1987, and has since gone on to insist that the French versions of his work are the only authentic ones. In so doing he effectively transformed the French versions into originals, marginalised the original originals and ensured that translations – or, in some cases, retranslations – into other languages were based on the French texts (Casanova 2004: 281-2; Woods 2006: 2-3, 41). Nabokov too has used the later English versions of his early Russian novels as the basis for subsequent renderings into other languages, notably French (Beaujour 1995: 719-20; Grayson 1977: 8). As the author he also felt free to rewrite both his own translations of his work and those made by other translators. In this way he overrode Winifred Roy's 1936 translation of his originally Russian novel *Camera Obscura* with his own much freer version (*Laughter in the Dark*, 1938); he also made two very different English versions of another of his early Russian novels, *Otchayanie* ('Despair', 1936), first in 1937 and then again, decisively, in 1966 (Grayson 1977: 59-82), "thus rendering both the Russian novel and the first English translation retroactively incomplete", as Beaujour puts it (1995: 720).

Literature however is a weakly institutionalised field, in which pronouncements about the status of a text may be contested. The Canadian writer Nancy Huston has lived mainly in Paris since 1973, writes in both English and French and translates her own work from one language into the other. Her novel *Cantique des plaines* (1993), which she had reworked from her English novel *Plainsong* (also 1993), caused controversy when it won an award reserved for original writings. Some critics argued that the French version showed every sign of being a translation, while the author protested it was not a translation but a rewriting and therefore an original work (Klein-Lataud 1996: 220-22). The case is similar to that surrounding the London Debt Agreement above. Although the author's word put both versions on a par, the fact itself that dissenting voices were raised concerning the status of the chronologically later version suggests that the author's declaration is not necessarily the last word. Authentication here remains open to challenge.

When authors collaborate with translators, some authorial authority is transferred to the translation. The Algerian writer Rachid Boudjedra has written in both Arabic and French and translated himself in both directions but now writes mostly in Arabic. When a translator translates his Arabic into French, he says, "I insist on working with him on the translation, because it has to be by Boudjedra, like the days when I wrote in French" (Casanova 2004: 268). The translation will not have the same status as the original, but the author's involvement in its creation lifts it above the level of ordinary translation and grants it at least quasi-equivalence. There are plenty of cases in which authors assist their translators, and in doing so control and authorise the result. The Polish writer Witold Gombrowicz, for instance, lived in Argentina for more than two decades and first translated his own work into Spanish, then collaborated with two French translators to produce

French versions of other works originally written in Polish. The definitive French translation of James Joyce's *Ulysses* appeared in 1929 with a title page identifying the book as a translation by Auguste Morel assisted by Stuart Gilbert and revised by Valéry Larbaud jointly with the author (Casanova 2004: 143, 145). Nabokov also collaborated with other translators on his own work but always retaining complete control of the process, treating his translators very much as hired hands and reserving for himself as the author the right to make any changes he saw fit (Grayson 1977: 7; Beaujour 1989: 112).

Translations authorised by the original author's active participation in the constitution of the text are a bit like authorised biographies to which the subject of the biography has lent his or her cooperation. They flaunt the signs of privileged access to the source and can thus claim a degree of authenticity. In a sense, this is authentication in a minor key. In principle, of course, all translations made of contemporary or recent work and brought into the public domain are authorised. They have to be if they are to comply with international copyright law, which in its current form stipulates that works are protected up to seventy years after the author's death. In all countries that subscribe to the Berne Convention translations can be published only with the permission of the original author or copyright holder. The authorisation bestows status and signifies a stamp of approval. This is perhaps the weakest form of explicit authentication. Like author-assisted translations, authorised translations are undoubtedly translations, but they have one up on any other translations that may be circulating. Typically, there tends to be just one authorised translation of a particular work in any one language; if there is more than one, the most recent is likely to serve as a corrective to its predecessor. When Michael Heim retranslated Milan Kundera's novel *The Joke* in 1984 (the first English translation of 1969, by David Hamblyn and Oliver Stallybrass, had drawn a furious public response from Kundera and had been revised in 1970), the author not only worked closely with his translator but eventually appended an approving note when the book was published, declaring this rendering to be "the first valid and authentic version of a book that tells of rape and has itself so often been violated" (in Woods 2006: 28-29, 38).

There is one further form of authentication that needs to be considered. It does not involve a pronouncement and comes about purely *de facto*. Although a decidedly weak form of authentication, it is quantitatively of huge importance. This is the case of all those translations that are used and handled as texts in their own right, without reference to the fact that they are translations. They have to all intents and purposes replaced their originals. They have become the pragmatic substitutes for their sources, and stand in for them so well that their being in fact translations is now irrelevant. To put it in terms of Relevance theory: their interpretive value has been whittled away by descriptive use and has fallen into oblivion. Of course, some translations fit more easily into this category than others. So-called 'covert' translations (House 1981), for example, which are keen to conceal their being translations, will have a better chance of passing for originals than texts that advertise their status as translations. Pragmatic equivalence means that a translation has managed to make everyone forget its origin. Whereas the Convention of Vienna imposed amnesia by judicial means, here authentication has taken place by default, as it were.

This is perhaps the closest that the approach to the question of equivalence which I am taking here comes to standard views of the matter. The traditional linguistic view assumed that equivalence was the result of sameness or similarity of meaning, however defined. It sought to infer equivalence from semantic relations between texts, and has now been largely abandoned in favour of more differentiated, communicatively-oriented approaches (Koller 1995, 2004; Neubert 2004). The latter prefer to posit equivalence in pragmatic terms as sameness or similarity of use value. Jelle Stegeman (1991), for example, argued that two texts were equivalent if no difference could be observed as regards their impact – inviting the thorny methodological problem of how to measure the impact of different texts in different populations. Anthony Pym (1995) and others emphasised that equivalence was a matter of a socially operative and enabling belief. Users commonly assume, Pym pointed out, that translations are equivalent to the texts they claim to represent, and indeed they must be able to believe in some type of equivalence pertinent to the situation if translation is to function in a social context at all (Pym 1995: 166-7).

This belief is properly a suspension of disbelief. Many translations, and covert translations more than most, work hard to look like originals and to be able to function like the originals they enact. The more successful they are, the more effective the belief system, that is, the suspension of disbelief. The really successful ones, be they intricately rhymed poems or microwave oven manuals, look every bit the part of an original, and of *the* original. But it does not take much to puncture the illusion. The trigger does not even have to be textual, it may be paratextual or extratextual. Any reminder that the text in question is in fact a translation threatens the assumption of equivalence and tells the reader: oh yes, this is only a translation, not quite the same thing as

the original, certainly not fully as authoritative as an original. The illusion of equivalence may have roughly the same pragmatic effect as authentication, but it remains much more vulnerable because it is based on convention and expectation only, that is, on a tacit agreement to maintain a fiction. In this sense it amounts at best to a weak form of authentication, one that cannot prevent a translation being put back in its place whenever someone takes the trouble to recall its origin. Needless to say, there are borderline cases similar to that of Nancy Huston's rewriting discussed above, in which it is more productive and enlightening to speak in terms of what Relevance theory calls descriptive rather than interpretive use (indeed Gutt 1991: 54-65 discusses some). The fact that there is such a grey area suggests that authentication has reached here its most diluted form.

Let me sum up the main argument I have pursued in this chapter. Equivalence between a translation and its original is established through an external, institutional, perlocutionary speech act. Rather than being an inherent feature of relations between texts, equivalence is *declared*. Establishing equivalence amounts to an act of authentication. A translation thus proclaimed to be equivalent to its parent text ceases to be a translation. Authenticating a translation means transforming it into an equivalent authentic text which, in its own particular sphere, can lay claim to the same authority as the original. To that extent equivalence authorises a translation to overwrite the original. Moreover, all equivalent texts are presumed to be consonant. They are taken to express the same intent, breathe the same spirit and speak with the same voice as the source. That is why an authenticated translation is also a definitive translation. It exists in one form only. There is only one Septuagint and each language has only one Book of Mormon and one legally valid version of each international treaty. A fully equivalent translation amounts to an authenticated translation, and, once authenticated, a translation has ceased to be a translation. Authentication and the positing of equivalence bring about translation's amnesia: they make it forget its origin and annul its own past. A translation may reach for equivalence but on attaining it, it self-destructs as translation. Equivalence spells the end of translation.

It follows that a translation, for as long as it remains a translation, cannot be equivalent to its source.

2. Before the End

A translation that has not yet ceased to be a translation cannot be equivalent to its source. Nor can it be the definitive version standing in for this source. If a translation were to be the definitive version of a given original, it would have attained equivalence and no longer be a translation. Indeed there is only one *Book of Mormon*, one Septuagint, and one authentic version per language of multilingual treaties, contracts and constitutions.

Translations for their part remain forever repeatable, and therefore provisional. A new, improved rendering can always be attempted, either by the translator or by someone else. "If anyone makes of these books of chronicles a better and more profitable English translation, may God reward him" ("Yif eny man makith of these bokes of cronicles a bett Englissh translacioun and more profitable, God do his mede"), John Trevisa wrote in 1387 (Wogan-Browne *et al.* 1999: 135). According to a possibly apocryphal story told in Edward Hall's *Chronicle* of 1548, the English Bible translator William Tyndale was visited in Antwerp in the 1520s by the merchant Augustine Packington, who wanted to purchase the entire print run of Tyndale's recently published New Testament. Although Tyndale knew Packington was only buying the books so the Bishop of London could burn them as heretical, he expressed delight at the prospect of the transaction because "the overplus of the money," as he put it, would make him "more studious to correct the said New Testament, and newly to imprint the same once again" (Burke 1993: 47; Daniell 2003: 145).

One can always offer another translation of a text, the only practical and temporary impediment in the modern world being the restrictions imposed by copyright law. This also means that the convergence of meaning, the consonance of voice and the singularity of intent that are attributed to fully authenticated equivalent texts, lie beyond the grasp of translation. That is precisely why an external performative speech act is required to create the fiction of equivalence and in so doing lever translation up beyond itself to the status of an authentic version on a par with the original – which is then, in the same move, as we saw in the previous chapter, transformed into one of several authentic versions.

Discourses about translation tend to project equivalence as something translators ought to strive for and perhaps to achieve. The norm of the 'faithful translator' as laid down in numerous codes of conduct of professional translators' and interpreters' organisations insists on translators reproducing originals completely and accurately, without addition, deletion, distortion or

intervention. It calls on translators to be so discreet as to spirit themselves away for the sake of the original's integrity, to bite their own tongues in the interests of consonance. Historical discourses about translation, too, abound in images and metaphors urging translators to make themselves unseen and unheard, to act as pure conduits. Only a translation purged of the translator's presence allows consumers to indulge the fiction of equivalence. The illusion of equivalence demands the elision of the translator as a subject in the text. Equivalence spells not only the end of translation but also the death of the translator. When a translation sublimates into an authentic equivalent version, it self-destructs as translation and takes the translator with it. There is a certain irony here: a translator may have to very work hard to create an illusion of equivalence, and a convincing illusion requires a translator so disembodied as to be invisible, or at least so impersonal as to be anonymous (as Pym 1992: 51-52 has it). When authentication makes equivalence a reality rather than an illusion, even bearing in mind that the reality in question is no more than a socially binding legal or institutional fiction, the translator is evacuated entirely. Equivalent versions are not translations.

For as long as a translation remains a translation, then, it will always have a translator's presence and therefore a translator's subject position inscribed in it, however well hidden they may be. There are several ways of showing this. One is by drawing on narratology. As a communicative act, a translation must have an addresser as well as an addressee. This consideration led Giuliana Schiavi (1996) to posit the notion of an 'implied translator' as a counterpart to the 'implied author', a concept familiar to narrative theory. In Schiavi's model, the implied translator was the agent who directed the original message to the new receptor-language audience. In an article written in parallel with Schiavi's in 1996, I highlighted cases in which the translator's discursive presence could not help but become directly visible in the translated text (Hermans 1996). They included cases in which translators could be seen struggling with cultural references (not just by adding explanatory footnotes but also by providing manifestly redundant or inadequate information in the text itself), cases in which the self-reflexiveness of texts invoked the language in which the original text was written, thus threatening the translation with self-contradiction,, and cases of 'contextual overdetermination', where a particular phrase might become untranslatable because too many other textual elements depend on this or that exact phrase. In her booklength study *Le conflit des énoncés* (1991) Barbara Folkart had taken a similar line, casting translation as reported speech and hence as the translator's re-enunciation of another utterance.

The kind of forensic stylistics made possible by corpus studies offers a very different way of detecting the translator's hand in translated texts. In an exploratory essay Mona Baker (2000) compared the work of two translators, Peter Clark and Peter Bush. Feeding a total of eight translated books, almost half a million words, into a computerised corpus of translations comprising around 6.5 million words at the time, Baker was able to show that, irrespective of the nature of the originals they tackled, each translator exhibited certain recurrent linguistic features to a degree that was statistically significant. Each translator, that is, left a personal thumb-print or stylistic signature on their translations. The signature was there in all their work, and was therefore independent of the original texts. Many of these choices must have been unconscious. They are linguistic tics, little idiosyncrasies or preferences that mark the way individuals use language. The same type of forensic stylistics had been used before, without reference to translation. For example, in 1995 it helped to identify and arrest the so-called Unabomber in the United States (the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, had been sending parcel bombs to airlines and universities for around fifteen years; when US newspapers published his political manifesto in 1995, his brother thought he recognised the style of writing and informed the FBI; linguistic analysis of personal and other documents written by Kaczynski confirmed him as the author and led to his arrest).[4] In 1996 the technique also correctly picked out *Newsweek* columnist Joe Klein as the author of the anonymously published novel *Primary Colors*, a fictionalised account of Bill Clinton's early career in Arkansas, showing detailed knowledge of the Clintons and their world; the author was identified by using a computer to locate similarities in linguistic usage between the novel and the assorted writings of a large number of people belonging to the Clinton circle.[5]

In what follows I want to try another approach, starting from the particular choices translators make as they translate. The underlying idea is simple. The translating subject cannot be elided or eliminated from translations because, as a form of text-production, translating requires the deployment of linguistic means in the host language, and this will involve dimensions other than those of the original. As a result, the translator's utterances are necessarily marked, revealing a

[4] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theodore_Kaczynski.
[5] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primary_Colors

discursively positioned subject. I will go on to argue that the intertextual and self-referential dimension of these choices render translation self-reflexive. Translations speak about themselves

Hostile dynasties

Let me begin with a transparent example. In a collection called *Women Writing in Dutch* published in 1994, Laureen Nussbaum presented fragments from the diary of Anne Frank in English translation (Nussbaum 1994). The section was extensively introduced and annotated. Nussbaum explained that in her opinion the standard English translation of Anne Frank's diary by B.M. Mooyaart-Doubleday was unsatisfactory: "the Doubleday translation tends to be too literal, which makes for awkward reading, and quite often it is downright wrong" (Nussbaum 1994: 572). She had corrected the alleged errors in her own translation, which she wanted to publish. Unfortunately, the copyright holders, the Doubleday publishing company in New York, refused permission for Nussbaum's alternative version to appear in print. She therefore faced a choice: either reprint the standard translation she disapproved of, or leave the Anne Frank chapter out of the collection altogether.

No doubt thoroughly annoyed, Nussbaum decided to print the Mooyaart-Doubleday version. However, she also inserted her own corrections into it, as a kind of running commentary. The results can be seen in a brief passage like the following. The main text represents Mooyaart-Doubleday's translation, the italicised words and phrases are Nussbaum's suggestions for alternative renderings (between square brackets) and additions (between accolade marks):

> I must keep my head high and be brave, those thoughts will come *{all the same}*, not once, but oh, countless times. Believe me, if you have been shut up *[confined]* for a year and a half, it can get too much for you some days. In spite of all justice *[fairness]* and thankfulness, you can't crush *[repress]* your feelings. (Nussbaum 1994: 552)

Nussbaum realised that the parentheses were intrusive and would make the reading of the translation "somewhat cumbersome", but she felt they were necessary "to do justice to the text that Anne really wrote" (1994: 573). In the passage above there are several parentheses in quick succession. Each intervention points to Nussbaum's disapproval of the Mooyaart-Doubleday rendering, so that we become aware of an ongoing discussion between the main text and the italicised parentheses. The words and phrases between square brackets and accolades contain obvious criticisms of the previous translator's choices and alleged omissions. In other words, the dialogue is polemical and its subject concerns the question how best to do justice in translation to what Anne Frank originally wrote. Nussbaum kept up her criticism in a series of searing footnotes. The critical exchange, or the slanging match, is one between translators, and also, arguably, between Nussbaum and the publishers Doubleday as the copyright holders whom Nussbaum wants to expose for protecting a translation she deems to be inferior. These remonstrations fly back and forth over the original author's head, as translators and publishers fight about how to translate Anne Frank. Nussbaum's interventions refer back to the original Dutch but they are aimed just as much at the perceived inadequacies in the existing translation. Her alternative choices and additions are manifestly oppositional, even if for legal copyright reasons they have been condemned to lead a grouching interstitial existence confined to brackets and footnotes.

I am not interested in establishing the rights and wrongs of Nussbaum's case against her fellow translator. Instead I want to follow up on the way the polemic lends Nussbaum's rendering a double edge. There is more than one palimpsest discernible beneath Nussbaum's words. Her version has one eye on the Dutch and the other on the preceding translation. She speaks simultaneously for Anne Frank and against Mooyaart-Doubleday. The former dimension bears on the translation as an interpretation and re-enactment of the underlying original, the latter on the translation as a critique of another translation. Both dimensions instigate difference and dispersal, and they imply self-reference and self-reflexivity.

There is no need to linger on the issue of interpretation, which has been discussed many times before. All interpretation implies an interpretive angle, a vantage point or subject-position from which things are observed and made sense of. Indeed modern hermeneutics since Heidegger has emphatically confirmed that prejudice, in the literal sense of pre-judgement, the observer's pre-existing horizon of assumptions and expectations, is a prerequisite for interpretation (Gadamer 1989: 268ff., 278ff.). For this reason individual acts of interpretation remain partial and open-ended; they cannot hope to exhaust the meaning of a text, not so much because texts are so rich as to be inexhaustible but because they are read from changing vantage-point in changing contexts.

Translation reflects interpretation. And because translation, for as long as it does not cease to be translation, remains repeatable, successive translations embody different interpretations. Dispersing in time and space, different translations, each in its own way, flesh out the interpretive potential of a given text. It is not just that each translation exemplifies a particular reading. Together they thematise the interpretive differences between them as they shift from one reading to another. Insofar as a text can always be translated again and no translation can lay claim to a definitive reading that would bring interpretive closure, translation figures interpretive difference. Each rendering exhibits its own reading and, in so doing, marks its difference from other readings, other interpretations. This marking constitutes a self-referential moment.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the modern world possesses an instrument to stop translation living out the centrifugal open-endedness of interpretation. The instrument has a name. It is called copyright law. It was at work, not very effectively, in the Anne Frank example just now. Insofar as translation embodies interpretive difference, the law grants the copyright holder a monopoly on the number and kind of interpretations that can enter the public domain in the form of translation.[6] At the very least it can push alternative readings into the margin of an approved reading, as the Anne Frank case shows. It is thus able to bring about a degree of interpretive closure, but only temporarily, up to seventy years after the author's death. Whereas translation celebrates the heterogeneity and proliferation of meaning, copyright law enables authors to impose what Jacques Derrida in a different context called "the hegemony of the homogeneous" (1998: 40). Insofar as the law permits translation to bring multiple interpretations into the open, each translation flaunts it identity through the difference with other translative interpretations.

The other dimension of Laureen Nussbaum's translation concerns not so much the way in which it refers back to its parent text and embodies a particular reading of it, as the way in which it highlights a particular mode of translating. Nussbaum's critique of the Mooyaart-Doubleday version was voiced in a paratextual note but it also crept into the translation itself. The visual presentation of the text with its numerous italicised parentheses left little doubt that Nussbaum's alternative choices were intended polemically to demonstrate a mode of translating assumed to be better suited than her predecessor's to this particular prototext. However, if the presentation had not visually dramatised Nussbaum's disagreement with her fellow translator, the polemic would still have been there. In any case, Nussbaum would obviously have preferred to see her own version printed in full rather than confined to the margins of Mooyaart-Doubleday's. Had she been granted permission to do this, the passage quoted above would have looked like this:

> I must keep my head high and be brave, those thoughts will come all the same, not once, but oh, countless times. Believe me, if you have been confined for a year and a half, it can get too much for you some days. In spite of all justice fairness and thankfulness, you can't repress your feelings.

This version incorporates Nussbaum's addition of "all the same" and everywhere else replaces Mooyaart-Doubleday's choices with Nussbaum's suggested alternatives. The challenge to the preceding translation is just as forceful and as pertinent, but since the text being targeted is no longer provided, the exact nature of the criticism and hence the confrontational aspect of Nussbaum's choices must remain a matter of speculation, unless one were to fetch the Mooyaart-Doubleday version and compare it line by line with Nussbaum's. Even if Nussbaum had not supplied a footnote identifying Mooyaart-Doubleday's translation as the one against which her own version asserted itself, her choices would still be polemical, only the antagonism would have remained under the surface, discernible only to readers aware of the intertextual connection.

As mentioned above, the debate between the translators, regardless of its degree of visibility in Nussbaum's text, rages over the head of the original author. It concerns in the first instance a number of specific choices at the level of words and phrases. But it is about more than this. Nussbaum's angry reference to the Mooyaart-Doubleday translation, whether advertised in the text or in the shape of silent allusion, qualifies as an instance of specific intertextuality in the French critic Gérard Genette's classification (Genette 1979: 81-83; 1982: 1-7). It has a metatextual aspect in that it constitutes a critical commentary on the previous translation. However the relation between Nussbaum's text and Mooyaart-Doubleday's goes beyond the issue of specific word choices and their intertextual echoes. It extends to that of the appropriate kind of translation that

[6] To quote just one rather striking example, in a letter to the *Times Literary Supplement* of 9 November 2000, George Steiner, author of the translation studies classic *After Babel* (Steiner 1975), reaffirmed his refusal to grant German or Hebrew translation rights to his novel *The Portage to San Cristóbal of A.H.*

would be required to adequately represent this particular original and presumably other originals like it. If we accept this extension we can expand the idea of intertextuality from the level of relations between particular texts to generic connections. This, then, is the level of generic intertextuality. And once this extension is granted, it is not hard to see the polemical edge of Nussbaum's text involving the even broader question of what makes a good or a valid translation as such. This is what Genette calls an architextual relation, one which ties a text to an entire category or text type, "the entire set of general or transcendent categories – types of discourse, modes of enunciation, literary genres – from which emerges each singular text" (1982: 1).

Every text exhibits, or has attributed to it, a relation to a genre and a type of discourse. Nussbaum's translation highlights this relation by casting aspersions on its predecessor. Criticising Mooyaart-Doubleday is for Nussbaum's text a way of staking a claim to be a superior instance of a certain type of translation (however defined: overt translations aiming at textual accuracy, stylistically adequate translations, translations of world classics, of war testimonials, of autobiographical writing, of diaries written by teenage girls,…) or, at the very least, to be an equally valid translation. There is, then, also a double dynamic at work in Nussbaum's translation on this intertextual level. On the one hand it inflects the translator's 'differential voice' (the term is Barbara Folkart's, 1991: 394) in opposition to another translation or possibly another mode of translating. On the other, it appeals, architextually, to a historically sedimented, socially accepted notion of translation as a type of text of which it presents itself as a token. The former dynamic is necessarily more specific than the latter, because it eyes a particular target.

The dynamic itself bypasses the original. Instead, it is played out in a metadiscursive domain in which translators observe their own translations and those of others, and comment on them through the differential choices they make. The distinction that Cecilia Wadensjö has made between representation by displaying and representation by replaying may help to clarify the point (Wadensjö 1998: 247). When translators replay an original, they re-enact it in such a way as to minimise any distance between the figure they are voicing and their own speaking selves. Displaying, by contrast, seeks to alert the audience to the enacting self and the particular way the original is being represented. Whereas replaying invites the translator's voice to be subsumed under that of the original speaker, displaying holds the translated discourse up for inspection as having been rendered in a certain manner. For the argument I am developing here (I will return to Wadensjö's distinction in the next chapter) it is important that either way the translator is keying the utterance in a certain manner, and this keying cannot be entirely reduced to the act of representation. Translators may flaunt their individual style of translating or they may quietly follow convention. Even if they never signal their agenda in a paratext, they show their hand in the choices they make. The element of display in every replaying reveals the translator's interaction with other translators. It is part of the claim that every translation makes: the claim to legitimacy as a translation.

There are countless other translations, apart from the Nussbaum case, in which a similar dynamic is in evidence, so much so that picking further examples is a matter of making a random selection. Vladimir Nabokov's rendering of Pushkin's *Eugen Onegin* (Pushkin 1975) is a particularly flamboyant exercise. Its paratexts pour scorn on every existing English version and champion literal translation as the exclusive form of genuine translation. Nabokov occasionally quotes his predecessors' versions in his footnotes, with the sole aim of demolishing them. The defiant literalism of his own wording, so emphatically at odds with earlier renderings, sends a double and perhaps contradictory message. It suggests that translation can be done in more ways than one and that some ways may be better than others, while claiming in the same breath that there is in fact only one correct way of doing it, which is Nabokov's way. Nabokov's *Onegin* seeks to redefine not just what a good translation is, but quite simply what translation is. Even without the huge critical apparatus with which he adorned his version, that message would be clear. Either way the polemical, oppositional, differential nature of his choices as a translator amounts to a running commentary on how Pushkin's original is to be read and how it is to be represented in English translation. And it is important that this running critical commentary about fellow translators and about translation that is inscribed in Nabokov's aggressive choices constitutes its own discursive dimension, one which is not part of the representation of Pushkin but parasitical on it. It is in this discursive dimension that Nabokov the translator berates other translators in and through the particular way he translates.

Here are some more cases, in descending order of eccentricity. The celebrated homophonic renderings of Catullus by Louis and Celia Zukofsky virtually demand to be read as parodic and carnivalesque inversions of the standard modes of poetic translation. Their bilingual Latin-English layout not only invites the reader to assess the English poems as representations of the Latin

parent texts but is also designed to show the extent to which the Zukofskys' strategy of privileging sound over sense destabilises the prevailing conventions of poetry translation, as indeed the translators announce in their preface (Zukofsky 1969). As mentioned in the previous chapter, Nabokov wrote his early novel *Camera obscura* in Russian, was dissatisfied with the English translation that Winifred Roy made of it in 1936 and produced his own, *Laughter in the Dark,* in 1938 (Grayson 1979: 5). The reworking amounted to a demonstration of how he wanted translations of his work to be done. The 'abusive fidelity' which Philip Lewis preaches and the 'minoritising' mode of translation that Lawrence Venuti practises are more ideologically motivated but equally emphatic in flaunting particular styles of translating intended as a criticism of mainstream ways of doing things (Lewis 1985; Venuti 1998).

The mainstream itself behaves in much the same way. When David Luke retranslated Thomas Mann's *Death in Venice* in 1996, he concluded his preface with a six-page catalogue of alleged errors in Helen Lowe-Porter's standard version of the novella (Mann 1996). As a result, the choices Luke makes in his own translation gesture not only to Thomas Mann but also, polemically, to Lowe-Porter, whose standard of accuracy Luke so virulently questioned. The history of translations of Freud is littered with such revisions and polemics, not just in English, where James Strachey's standard version has been praised as well as reviled and revised, but in other languages as well. The Spanish translation by José Etcheverry published in 1978-82 was consciously designed as more literal and internally consistent than the 1948 *Obras completas* of Luis López-Ballesteros and than those of Ludovico Rosenthal which date from 1952-56. The new French version by Jean Laplanche and his team mounted an elaborate defence of literalism that repudiated Strachey, quoted Chateaubriand and André Chouraqui with approval, and would have delighted Nabokov (Ornston 1992: 114-90; Laplanche 1992: 14, 16, 207-08). In all these cases the paratexts measure and explain the critical distance from the predecessors, and this distance is then rehearsed in the differential choices that make up the actual translations. Again, the critical distance, and the intertextual links, would be there even if there were no paratext to announce them. We are dealing with a metatranslative dimension.

The perception of intertextuality may be in the eye of the beholder. Indeed any accusation of plagiarism between translations is likely to involve someone having to prove that the similarities between two translations are due not to two translators having independently rendered the same original but to one translator having surreptitiously copied another. If in this case demonstrating a specific intertextual relation is part of the burden of proof, more generic linkages are also possible. When Friedrich Hölderlin's renderings of Sophocles appeared in print in 1804, several reviewers thought they were the work of someone who was mentally disturbed. One critic, Johann Heinrich Voss jr. (the son of the translator Johann Heinrich Voss), wondered in a private letter: "What do you make of Hölderlin's Sophocles? Is the man mad or does he just pretend, and is his Sophocles a veiled satire on bad translations?" (in Fioretos 1999: 277). Either way, it appears, Voss jr could not quite fit a text that was so wholly beyond the pale into the category 'translation' as he knew it; the closest he could come was by suggesting satirical intent. Whether this was the translator's aim remains a moot point. Still, judged by the prevailing standards of German literary translation from the classical languages, Hölderlin's extraordinary version could be seen as a deliberate inversion of these standards, and this was evidently a possibility Voss considered.

The intertextual relation that ties one translation to another does not have to establish what Jorge Luis Borges, speaking of the translators of *The Thousand and One Nights*, called a "hostile dynasty" in which a subsequent translator translates with the express aim of demolishing a predecessor (Borges 2004: 94). In fact, the overwhelming majority of translations fall in with existing translations and prevalent modes of translating. This is so obvious that it is made explicit only in exceptional cases. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, who translated the *Dialogues* of Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, for example, mention in their 'Translators' Introduction' that they have rendered key terms pertaining to Deleuze's thinking in a way consistent with recent translations of Deleuze's other works (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: xii-xiii). Perhaps the most striking practical application of this kind of translative intertextuality however lies elsewhere, in the use professional translators today make of computerised translation memories. Since these memories have the capacity to store vast numbers of existing translations, new translation jobs can be fired at the collection to see what kind of matching will result. Regardless of the size of the memory, the principle is generic intertextuality in action: previous translations furnish a larger or smaller part of the fabric of the new translation to be made.

Friendly filiations may combine in complex ways with hostile stand-offs. In 1768 Edward Harwood published an English rendering of the New Testament which, as the title had it, sought to translate the sacred writings "with the Freedom, Spirit, and Elegance, with which other English

Translations from the Greek Classics have lately been executed". In his preface he explained that this was "*not a* verbal *translation, but a* liberal *and* diffusive *version of the sacred classics*" (Harwood 1768: iii). His aim, he said, was to give "a fair and honest version of the divine Volume, just as if I had sat down to translate *Plato, Xenophon, Thucydides, Plutarch,* or any other Greek writer" (1768: vi). By aligning himself with secular translation he could claim, on the one hand, philological impartiality and dispassionate judgement in establishing the "*true* signification of the Original," and, on the other, freedom from the sectarian tendentiousness of "false translations" (1768: iv, viii).

As his model Harwood invoked Sebastien Castellio's Latin Bible translation of 1551, an eminently accessible version which had pursued a Ciceronian standard of eloquence and used classical substitutes for traditional Biblical terms (for instance, *collegium* instead of *synagoga* and, strikingly*, respublica* instead of *ecclesia*; 1768: v; Daniell 2003: 611-12). Harwood wanted to represent the words of the Apostles "with that propriety and perspicuity in which they themselves, I apprehend, would have exhibited them had they *now* lived and written in our language" (1768: iii). To this end, and to counter the "bald and barbarous language" of earlier translations, he employed distinctly modern idiom ("the vest of modern elegance") and the kind of explanatory paraphrase typical of much eighteenth-century translating ("perspicuous and explicit … upon rational principles", 1768: iv-vi). The famous opening sentence of the gospel according to John, which in the King James Bible reads: "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God", appears in Harwood's version as: "Before the origin of this world existed the LOGOS – who was then with the Supreme God – and was himself a divine person" (1768: 281). As the use of dashes indicates, and as David Daniell has shown (2003: 607-8), Harwood's style also echoes that of contemporary English novelists. Overall, Harwood's intertextuality is a web of allegiances and antagonisms which tie his version not only to its prototext and to original writings in the receptor language, but also to a network of pre-existing translations and modes of translating. The appeal to that network is part of Harwood's metadiscourse as a translator; and it is so with or without his paratexts.

Self-reference

The constant dialogue among translators about what can pass as (valid, appropriate, legitimate) translation, and the differential edge that each individual rendering possesses, constitute a translation-specific intertextuality which emerges as translators praise or berate one another in and through the very way in which each translator translates. It is this intertextuality which provides translation with its self-referential and self-reflexive dimension.

Self-reference lies dormant in every utterance. The present sentence implies the self-referential statements that it is a sentence and that it is a sentence in English. Self-reference involves a degree of self-observation. The sentences you are now reading know they are in English. Self-reference can be raised to a higher level of explicitness in the form of self-reflexivity and self-description. In most of the examples above (Nussbaum, Nabokov, Zukofsky, Luke, the Freud translators), the paratexts and the differential choices made in the translations themselves brought into view ongoing debates and expectations about how to translate, what can or should be accepted as translation, the regulative and constitutive norms of translation, its prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences and permissions, in short, the entire system of translation underpinning the decisions being made by individual translators as they go about their business.

Before exploring the self-referential dimension of translation further, let us inspect the idea of self-reference a little more closely. Consider the following passage, which occurs a few pages from the end of David Lodge's 1993 novel *Changing Places*. The scene shows two fictional characters, Philip and Morris, who are discussing how novels end. Both speakers are university professors specialising in literature and both are very familiar with the work of Jane Austen. Their conversation is presented, unusually, in the form of drama:

> PHILIP: [...] I mean, take the question of endings. [...] You remember that passage is *Northanger Abbey* where Jane Austen says she's afraid that her readers will have guessed that a happy ending is coming up at any moment.
> MORRIS: (*nods*) Quote, 'Seeing in the tell-tale compression of the pages before them that we are all hastening together to perfect felicity.' Unquote.
> PHILIP: That's it. Well. That's something the novelist can't help giving away, isn't it; that his book is shortly coming to an end? (Lodge 1993: 218)

The passage can hardly avoid being read self-referentially, as an ironic comment within the novel on the ending of novels, and therefore on the ending of this novel too. The reader realises that Philip and Morris may be knowledgeable about how readers can tell that novels are coming to an end when the fictional characters in these novels cannot see this, but being characters in a novel themselves they do not know that the reader of *Changing Places* can tell from the tell-tale compression of the pages that their own story is about to end as well (even though, in the edition I am quoting from, *Changing Places* is the first of three novels bound in one volume; it ends on page 218 of 897). The fact that the scene is presented according to the conventions of theatrical texts rather than in the more usual form of narrative, heightens the self-reference and draws attention to the conventions of the genre.

If, as a genre, the novel is thought of as a particular form distinct from other forms, then thematising this form within the form renders it self-reflexive. In the scene above, the novel can be seen to observe its own form by reminding itself both of the material object it is – a volume with numbered pages that readers work through as they read – and of the conventions governing the discursive presentation of its narrative. In addition, we as readers can appreciate our ability to look into a fictional world precisely because the fictional characters cannot see their own fictionality even though they evidently appreciate other fictional worlds like Jane Austen's.

Self-reference and its heightened version, self-reflexiveness, come in a variety of manifestations. The present sentence, for example, contains eight words. This one has four. These sentences are in English. René Descartes' emphatic declaration, in the penultimate paragraph of his *Discours de la méthode*, that he has written his book in French and not in Latin, reminds readers of what they already know, because the claim that the book's language is French is indeed expressed in the French language. As Derrida has noted, Descartes' statement "Et si j'écris en français […] plutôt qu'en latin" (And if I write in French […] rather than in Latin) is, in the French formulation in which Descartes wrote it, a performative as well as a constative: it enacts what it states, for indeed it is not in Latin but in French (Derrida 2004: 1).

Consider *Figure 1*. It is a painting by the seventeenth-century Flemish artist Cornelius Gijsbrechts. Not much is known about Gijsbrechts, except that he worked in Germany and the Scandinavian lands in the 1660s and '70s (Koester 1999: 12-17). Look at it closely. The painting is a still-life showing two dead birds hanging upside down against a rather dark wall. It appears not to have been framed and looks unfinished; perhaps it was abandoned before it was finished. The canvas is nailed to a fairly rough piece of wood; the top left corner has come away and hangs down over the picture. Nevertheless the birds have been drawn with care and in exquisite detail.

Figure 1: Cornelius Gijsbrechts, Still Life of Two Dead Birds Hanging on a Wall, c.1672
(By permission of the Statens Museum for Kunst, Copenhagen)

Now look again. The painting is unframed, but is not an unfinished work at all. Nor does it consist of a layer of paint applied to a piece of canvas that is frayed at the edges and stuck to a piece of wood. In fact, the wood too is painted and it forms part of the painting. What we have is a

typical trompe-l'oeil performance. The picture is meant to be left unframed, and it shows a painted canvas which appears to be nailed to a piece of wood.

Gijsbrechts was a master of this kind of trickery. *Figure 2* looks like a photograph of the reverse of a framed painting. However it is not the reverse of one of Gijsbrechts's paintings. The wooden frame that we see, and the canvas it holds, are both painted. The painting consists of a picture of the back of a painting, drawn with uncanny precision, including the painted number 36 on the little piece of paper apparently fixed to the canvas with red sealing wax.

Figure 2: Cornelius Gijsbrechts, The Reverse of a Framed Painting, 1670
(By permission of the Statens Museum for Kunst, Copenhagen)

Both these paintings by Gijsbrechts are self-reflexive, and thus more than merely self-referential. They consciously exploit the illusionistic effect brought about by their realistic depiction. The painted frame can easily be mistaken for a real frame, and the painted wood and nails for real wood and nails. But the painted truth that we think we see is deceptive, for the canvas with the dead birds of *Figure 1* cannot be removed from the wood and framed, and the painted frame of *Figure 2* cannot be turned around to reveal the front of the painting since it actually is the front, only made to look like the back. In both cases the care lavished on the representation is turned ironically against the viewer, who is reminded that the pictures are visual puns, representations playing on the idea of representation, playful pictorial comments on the painter's craft. Crucially, what makes the paintings work is both the natural likeness and the implicit reference to convention. We normally expect paintings to be framed, and to be hung with the front, not the back, facing the viewer. We are momentarily wrongfooted when the paintings deliberately thwart these expectations by refusing a frame or by integrating it into the painted surface.

Metatranslation

Translation too is inherently self-referential form. The form is framed by the entry on the title page identifying the text as a translation. That entry invites the reader to enter into a contract, an agreement to read the text as simulating a discourse in another language. The contract allows the reader's awareness of the original as being distinct from the translation to remain latent for as long as the translation illusion, the illusion of equivalence, lasts. The illusion can never be complete. If it were, the translation would cease to be a translation, as we saw in the previous chapter. But together with the contract on which it is based it permits us to state, casually and elliptically, that 'I have read Dostoevsky', when in fact I know I have read a translation of Dostoevsky.

Self-reference can be thrown into relief. This happens as soon as a text is recognised as a translation. The label tells us that someone is reporting or relaying someone else's words. The announcement that the text to follow is a translation frames the re-enactment that follows, if only by activating a particular set of expectations which may or may not subsequently be satisfied. A translator's preface will make the difference between the frame and what is contained within it even more emphatic. It draws attention to what Wadensjö called the display, at the expense of the replay. The translation itself then merely exemplifies one way of translating among others, one translative mode selected from a range of available modes.

To put this more strongly: approached through the preface that frames it, a translation dramatises one particular type of representation among others, and what matters is the particular kind of representation on display rather than the absent original. What is at stake when things are seen from this angle is not so much the reproduction of this or that original, but the choice of one mode of reproduction in preference to other existing or available modes. That choice is typically stated in the translator's preface, and it is enacted in the translation itself. In this way a translator's preface prevents an uninhibited reading of the translation because its echo can still be heard while the performance is under way. The actress who tells us how she is going to play Ophelia, will go on to play Ophelia like an actress playing Ophelia. What we then witness is an Ophelia played by a certain actress in a certain way. The curtain-raiser, the preface, makes us complicit in a self-conscious, double-edged performance.

The latent self-referentiality of translation is also raised as soon as we are reminded, in a translation, of the translation contract itself, or when a translation emphatically gestures to other translations or to particular modes of translating, that is, when its translation-specific intertextuality comes to the fore. At that moment we consider not so much the way in which the translation re-enacts its donor text, but the way it interacts with existing translations and with expectations about translation. The self-referentiality of translation is raised to self-reflection when the translative act itself is rehearsed within a translation, when the form – translation as a form distinct from other forms – re-enters the form and the translation contract is renegotiated within the text. This happens when the performance of translation is thematised in a translation itself and metatranslation invades translation.

Arthur Conan Doyle's story 'The Greek Interpreter' (Conan Doyle 1951) can be read as containing ironies of this kind. The story is perhaps not widely known, so here is the plot line. Melas, a Greek interpreter, accosts Sherlock Holmes in the street with an account of how, two days ago, he was kidnapped in central London and taken to a house somewhere on the outskirts of the city. There two Englishmen forced him, under threat of grievous bodily harm, to interpret for them. They produced someone they were holding prisoner, a pale and emaciated figure, his face covered in sticking plaster, with one pad covering his mouth. The prisoner, it turned out, was Greek; he had arrived in Britain only recently, and spoke no English. The two Englishmen, being English and villainous, did not speak any foreign languages. Melas had no choice but to interpret between the villains and their prisoner. At the end of the session he was taken away and dropped on Wandsworth Common; from there he made his way to Clapham Junction and caught the last train back to Victoria Station. Later on in the story it becomes clear that the prisoner, named Kratides, was the brother of a Greek girl whom one of the English villains had carried off and wanted to marry for her money. Kratides, the trustee of his sister's fortune, had inadvertently fallen into the villains' hands. He refused to sign his sister's money over to them, and to compel him they were starving him to death. Because the girl was being held in the same house, the villains had covered Kratides' face with sticking plaster, hoping she would not recognize him should she happen to see him. Despite Sherlock Holmes' best efforts the story ends tragically with Kratides dead and the villains fleeing abroad, taking the girl with them. Poetic justice is done when some months later a report arrives which tells of the two villains killing each other after a quarrel, although Holmes prefers to believe that the girl probably dispatched both her captors.

The interpretation scene, the central episode in the story and the one from which Holmes derives all his clues, is a peculiar specimen of dialogue interpreting. Melas, the unwilling intermediary, stands between the two English villains and the Greek prisoner. The latter is bound and gagged. The villains untie one of his arms and hand him a slate, on which he will write down, in Greek, his answers to Melas' spoken words. What follows is therefore an exercise in bimedial as well as bilingual interpreting. Melas hears English which he interprets into spoken Greek, then he reads the written Greek answers and interprets them into spoken English. We, the readers, read all this on the page, in English only.

As the conversation unfolds and Melas interprets, he realises that the villains do not understand Greek and are unable to check on the words he speaks in that language. So he starts playing a dangerous game, tagging brief questions of his own to the translated words he addresses to the prisoner. Kratides quickly catches on, and the two Greeks engage in a private monolingual conversation that takes shape entirely in the margin of the bilingual spoken and written exchange. As Melas recounts it to Sherlock Holmes afterwards, the conversation ran like this:

> 'You can do no good by this obstinacy. *Who are you?*'
> 'I care not. *I am a stranger in London.*'
> 'Your fate will be on your own head. *How long have you been here?*'

'Let it be so. *Three weeks.*'
'The property can never be yours. *What ails you?*'
'It shall not go to villains. *They are starving me.*'
'You shall go free if you sign. *What house is this?*'
'I will never sign. *I do not know.*'
'You are not doing her any service. *What is your name?*'
'Let me hear her say so. *Kratides.*'
'You shall see her if you sign. *Where are you from?*'
'Then I shall never see her. *Athens.*' (Conan Doyle 1951:316)

The italicised words are exchanged between the two Greek speakers only and they remain intelligible only to them. The rest takes on bilingual form. There was no risk, incidentally, of the villains catching names like 'London' or 'Athens' and becoming suspicious, because Kratides would have written them as *Λονδον* and *Αθιναι* (or possibly, in capital letters, *ΛΟΝΔΟΝ* and *ἈΘΙΝΑΙ*). From an ethical point of view, of course, Melas's behaviour flouts all the deontic principles of the interpreting profession. He manifestly abuses his linguistic monopoly to gain information of benefit to himself. But then, he is justified in doing so, since his employers are criminals and Melas, having been dragged into the situation against his will, is bravely attempting to assist an innocent victim.

The unusual juxtaposition of translated and untranslated discourse within one half spoken, half written conversation, however, cannot fail to alert the reader to the difference between the two discourses. It is emphasised typographically by the use of italics. It calls for increased attention, as the reader needs to separate out the bilingual from the monolingual exchange and the respective recipients of each. In focusing on that difference, the translated nature of the non-italicised words catches the eye as much as the non-translated nature of the italicised ones. Each part of the exchange flaunts its own status, contrastively and, since both parts come to us in English only rather than in English and Greek, ironically.

The monolingual representation of a bilingual scene cannot help attracting attention to its medium. In the same way, a text that contains words or phrases already in the language into which it is being translated presents particular problems for the translator. In the letters of Vincent van Gogh, for example, we regularly encounter English phrases interspersed in the Dutch text. They stand out, as foreign bodies in an otherwise linguistically uniform whole. In the Penguin translation of van Gogh's letters (van Gogh 1996) these English phrases appear unaltered. It would not be right to say they have been left untranslated, since they are clearly part of the process of translation that the text as a whole has undergone. We might say they have been translated into themselves, into a form identical to their original form. However, being now commonplace English phrases in an English text, they no longer stand out. So, in order to convey to the Anglophone reader the surplus value of English words featuring as foreign bodies in a Dutch text, the translator, acting as an editor of sorts, inserted footnotes in the English version informing the reader that those particular phrases were already in English in the original. The footnotes rather conspicuously introduce a new speaking voice in the margins of the English text, and they tell the reader of a particular translation problem – not only that of translating into English phrases that were already in English, but, in addition, the extra relief English words acquire when they function in a Dutch text. Still, each footnote plays out a little paradox. Stressing the Englishness of a phrase which reaches readers in English anyway risks an absurd level of redundancy, which those readers can only dispel by reminding themselves that the surrounding text was originally not in English. It cannot therefore have been van Gogh who wrote all those other English words that are not footnoted in the translation.

Jacques Derrida's essay 'Signature Event Context' as translated into English by Samuel Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman (Derrida 1977) abounds with bracketed French words signalling the limits of translatability as perceived by the translators. Some interventions are explicitly identified as stemming from '*trans.*', that is, the translators. One famous crux appears with a bracketed amplification as "*différance* [difference and deferral, *trans.*]" (1977: 179). To render the Derridean "différance" as "*différance*" was not yet an obvious choice in 1977, and the translators' addition of the two meanings that are collapsed in the French neologism explains the nature of the problem to the reader. On other occasions the English text shows a degree of lexical variation which the translators appear to regard as perhaps unfortunate but inevitable. The repeated insertion of the same French term to match a variety of English renderings suggests as much. We read of "his intentions [*vouloir-dire*]", "the desire to mean what one says [*vouloir-dire*]", "its 'original' desire-to-say-what-one-means [*vouloir-dire*]", "the presence of meaning [*vouloir-dire*]" and "the exchange of intentions and meanings [*vouloir-dire*]" (1977: 177, 181, 185, 191, 194). The translator's presence

makes itself felt through the marked contrast between the stability of the French term and the mutability of its various context-bound approximations in English.

These variations and supplements mark an impasse in the passage from one language to another, the passage also to translation. Put differently, they signal not so much the *difficulty* of translation, as the difficulty of *translation*. The problem, that is, lies in translation as a social construct, more particularly in the expectations audiences bring to texts labelled 'translation'. The translators are perfectly capable of glossing the original and devising corresponding expressions. Had they but world enough and time, they could catch the original's every nuance – but it would take forever, literally. The translators' problem lies in meeting the distinctive audience expectation I already mentioned in the previous chapter, namely that the translation supply a single linear discourse matching the single linear discourse of its model – the 'quantitative' measure of translation, as Derrida would later put it (2004: 428). The contingency of the expectations associated with translation is highlighted precisely in those instances where the translation seems unable to live up to this quantitative measure. Through the way they deal with individual problems, the translators are throughout commenting on translation.

In 'Limited Inc abc *. . .* ' (translated by Sam Weber), Derrida's lengthy response to John Searle's attack on 'Signature Event Context', Derrida states in so many words that he is writing in French ("I am trying to respond in French", 1977a: 173) – but since we read these words in English, the incongruity of the statement already highlights the presence of more than one voice inhabiting the translated discourse. A couple of pages earlier Derrida had introduced the French acronym "Sarl" ('*Société à responsabilité limitée*'), which puns on the name of his opponent, Searle. Knowing that his essay would be translated into English, Derrida had directly addressed the translator with a request: "I ask that the translator leave this conventional expression in French and if necessary, that he explain things in a note" (1977a: 170); the request is translated, and indeed it is met, leaving the duly italicised and untranslated acronym as the visible evidence of the translator's cooperative handiwork. Speaking positions are thereby dramatised in the very performance of translation.

In 'Signature Event Context' the French words *éventualité* and *possibilité* had both been rendered as "possibility". The reader of the English, of course, would not have known that behind "possibility" lay two different French words. In Derrida's altercation with Searle however the difference between the French terms as they appear in the essay's original French version becomes relevant. In the second essay therefore the translator corrects the earlier conflation of the two words. Where the earlier essay said at one point that "Austin excludes this possibility" (1977: 189-90), the later essay first points out the translation error ("it is regrettable that the distinction […] was not rendered in the English translation", 1977a: 229) and then quotes at some length from the first essay, recuperating its wording and simultaneously obliging the translator to amend the earlier rendering of the key term in a bracketed addition: "Austin excludes this *eventuality* [*éventualité*, initially translated as 'possibility']", 1977a: 229). Here again the issue of translation is being thematised within the text itself – in this case both the original and the translated text. Not only that, the repeatability of translation is being both talked about and acted out – but acted out in the translation only.

More paradoxical is the passage in 'Limited Inc abc…' where Derrida, having used the term "fake-out" ("What a fake-out, leaving me flat-footed…"), carries on for a couple of sentences and then suddenly retraces his steps, wondering, "I cannot imagine how Sam Weber is going to translate 'fake-out'" (1977a: 213). It is a peculiar statement to make, for in the translation we are reading the term has already been translated by Sam Weber, a few sentences earlier, and without a hitch ("What a fake-out, leaving me flat-footed…"). To explain what he assumes might pose a problem for the translator, Derrida first gives his own understanding of it as a football term. He then returns to the French word which apparently sits behind "fake-out", namely "contre-pied" (which now appears in the English text in French, as it is emphatically to the French word that Derrida is referring) as French lexicographers understand it. He quotes the definition of it offered in Littré's dictionary. This definition however we read quoted in English, down to a citation from La Fontaine (except for the key-word *contre-pied* in the citation: "'People have taken precisely the *contre-pied* of the will.' La Fontaine"; *ibid.)* – when "fake-out", on its first occurrence in the English text we are reading, already covered Derrida's private understanding of *contre-pied* in a straight, unmarked, one-to-one matching. In anticipating what subsequently turned out to be a non-problem for the translator, Derrida has not only implicated the translator in the translation, but allowed us to register Weber's discursive presence in the curious situation where, having already and perfectly adequately dealt with *contre-pied* as 'fake-out', the translator is taken back to the corresponding French term which he is now obliged to put back into its French form as the problem it never was.

As a result we end up reading, incongruously, because in English, the definition of a French word in a French dictionary. Translation is being thematised here in more ways than one.

Finally, here is a little practical exercise. Unfortunately it will not work if you can read German, because you will see the point straight away. If you are lucky enough not to have any German, please read on. In one of his case histories Sigmund Freud writes about a neurotic patient, the so-called Rat Man, who was passionately in love with a woman. The lady had an English cousin named Richard, or Dick for short. One day the patient, who was intensely jealous of this Richard, suddenly became obsessed with the idea that he, the patient, was too fat and had to lose weight at all costs, and so he began to exercise madly. Here is Freud's account, exactly as he wrote it, except that I am giving it here in English. The few sentences I have left out (indicated by […]) do not affect the passage or the exercise in any way. Please read the passage carefully and try to answer the questions that follow:

> One day while he was away on his summer holidays the idea suddenly occurred to him that he was too fat and that he must *make himself thinner*. So he began getting up from table before the pudding came round and tearing along the road without a hat in the blazing heat of an August sun. Then he would dash up a mountain at the double, till, dripping with perspiration, he was forced to come to a stop. [...]
> Our patient could think of no explanation of this senseless obsessional behaviour until it suddenly occurred to him that at that time his lady had also been stopping at the same resort; but she had been in the company of an English cousin, who was very attentive to her and of whom the patient had been very jealous. This cousin's name was Richard, and, according to the usual practice in England, he was known as *Dick*. Our patient, then, had wanted to kill this Dick.

Clearly, the patient envies Richard alias Dick because he sees the English cousin as a rival. He wants the rival out of the way, to be rid of him, hence the suppressed wish to kill Dick. So far so good. But why the frantic jogging? How will you connect the jogging with the desire to see Richard dead?

Various explanations suggest themselves. Perhaps the patient simply wanted to make himself more attractive? Perhaps Richard, too, was thin and the patient was eager to match his rival's thinness? Perhaps being thin would give the patient a better chance of killing Richard, or of gaining the lady's favour? All these explanations are plausible and sensible, and all are wrong. Nevertheless the passage above translates into English exactly what Freud wrote in plain, intelligible German. Why then does it remain impenetrable in English while Freud's German makes perfect sense? There is a solution, and it hinges on a single short word. Read the passage again and you will see:

> One day while he was away on his summer holidays the idea suddenly occurred to him that he was too fat (German: *dick*) and that he must *make himself thinner*. So he began getting up from table before the pudding came round and tearing along the road without a hat in the blazing heat of an August sun. Then he would dash up a mountain at the double, till, dripping with perspiration, he was forced to come to a stop. [...]
> Our patient could think of no explanation of this senseless obsessional behaviour until it suddenly occurred to him that at that time his lady had also been stopping at the same resort; but she had been in the company of an English cousin, who was very attentive to her and of whom the patient had been very jealous. This cousin's name was Richard, and, according to the usual practice in England, he was known as *Dick*. Our patient, then, had wanted to kill this Dick. (Freud 1963: 31-32)

The difference between this passage and the first one is that a German word has been added between brackets; the word is also explicitly identified as being a German word. It is in this form, with the bracketed aside, that the passage appeared in print. As soon as the reader connects the bracketed German word with the English cousin's popular name, the riddle is solved. If the case study represents historical truth, the connection also gave Freud his breakthrough when he was treating the patient. Freud, that is, explains the patient's behaviour as a case of transference, an association of 'fat' with the name 'Dick'. In German the two words sound the same, hence the ready association of one with the other. In English the link remains entirely opaque – indeed if the patient had not spoken German he would not have gone jogging. The translator, Philip Rieff, obviously saw the problem coming and intervened by informing the reader in the bracketed aside

that the word for 'fat' in German is 'dick'. We can now understand the connection in the patient's mind between losing weight and killing Dick. The urge to kill off the fat in his own body transfers to a culturally acceptable plane the repressed murderous intent towards the rival.

The translator's aside stands out from the rest of the text. We know the bracketed words represent an intervention by the translator because in uttering them the translator is not translating. The word *dick* repeats Freud's German word, untranslated, and the word 'German' does not occur in Freud's text, it is the translator's label to denote the language he is translating from. In the bracketed aside the translator briefly leaves his translating behind and addresses the reader in his own name to offer much needed help: the reader needs to be told to remember that 'fat' in German is 'dick', so the connection with the name Dick will be clear.

Of course, the problem only arises because in English the adjective 'fat' does not sound like 'Dick' and there is no readily available alternative that fits the bill. This is the translator's bad luck. As a result, he is forced to interrupt his own performance and, breaking cover, explain the problem to the reader. In other words, the problem of translating into English the similar-sounding words 'dick' and 'Dick' as they occur in the German, here invades the translation itself. As a result, the passage as printed in English reveals two separate active voices, Freud's and the translator's, and the latter, not Freud, is reflecting on an insurmountable translation problem, an instance of homophony as fortuitous linguistically as it is crucial for Freud's entire project. The reflection evidently extends beyond the two bracketed words that the translator has added to the passage. It is not until the end of the second paragraph that the reader realises why it matters that 'dick' happens to be German for 'fat'. At the same time, the translator's recourse to brackets comprising a minimal and unattributed explanation is a relatively discreet solution, less intrusive than a footnote and less presumptuous than a wholesale rewriting of the entire scene. To that extent the particular way in which the translator thematises the translation problem within his translation suggests a particular view of how translators should behave.

If the passage is self-reflexive in confronting the reader directly with a translation problem and a proposed solution, it offers another, more oblique comment on translation as well, and again it is the translator who is making the comment over the original author's head. In English, 'dick' happens to be a slang word for penis. In Freud's German text this connotation plays no part. What matters there is that 'dick' means 'fat' and sounds like the name Dick, for this homophony is what makes the patient attack the flab in his own body. In English however the fact that 'dick' connotes 'penis' is impossible to ignore, especially in a case study which revolves around sexual obsession and repression. In making no reference at all to the slang meaning of 'dick', the English text demonstratively refrains from accommodating an obviously meaningful element. The translator's reticence amounts to a significant omission, and hence a statement. The translator evidently does not see it as part of his job to articulate a dimension of meaning absent from the original, however urgently the discourse in English may invite it. The statement, in other words, consists of an eloquent silence, and it concerns the limits of the translator's task as this translator sees them.

Perhaps the translator's unspoken comment is the more significant of the two. It shows that self-referential statements about translation occur in translations without having to be stated in prefaces, footnotes, bracketed parentheses or other paratexts. They are inscribed in the choices translators make as they translate. These choices invoke, intertextually and architextually, other translations and a concept of translation as perceived by an individual translator. By adopting a position vis-à-vis that body of translations the translator marks not only a discursive presence but also a critical viewpoint. And since translations necessarily contain these positionings, they speak about themselves, with more or less emphasis.

Let me conclude. Self-reference accompanies, in latent form, all translation. It is raised to metatranslative self-reflection when translation observes its own operations and the factors conditioning those operations. This observing reveals the observer's – that is, the translator's – subject-position in the text. Self-reference may be raised to self-reflexiveness in paratexts, in discursive interventions by translators breaking into the texts they are transmitting and in translators' defiantly unconventional choices, but it is also there in everyday conventional choices. Even when self-reference remains latent and submerged, we can tease it out by focusing on translation-specific intertextual links and on the provisionality of every rendering, and by reading translations differentially, based on choices which fall in with or diverge from prevailing patterns and expectations.

The self-reference of translation brings into view a metadimension where translation speaks about itself. Self-reference and self-reflection allow us to appreciate not only the individual signature of a given version, but also the particular expectations to which it responds, irrespective of whether the response takes the form of compliance or defiance. To the extent that the interplay

between expectations, responses and adjustments determines what counts as translation, when and where, self-reference furnishes insight into the internal structure, the boundaries and the temporality of translation.